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RETHINKING JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS: INDEPENDENCE,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
PUBLIC SUPPORT
by Joseph A. Colquitt*
Of all the difficult choices confronting societies when they go
about designing their legal systems, among the most controversial
are those pertaining to judicial selection and retention.1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no one best way to select judges.2  Any judicial selection
system has both strengths and weaknesses.  In order to create the
best judicial selection process possible, society must be willing to
design and create selection paradigms that result in the best-availa-
ble individuals taking the bench even though, in the process, some
well-entrenched aspects of existing schemes must fall by the
wayside.
Judges usually take the bench via election or appointment.3  Re-
gardless of the judicial selection method employed in a given juris-
diction, most judges, even those in states utilizing judicial elections,
initially take the bench through appointment.4  Therefore, it be-
* Jere L. Beasley Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; re-
tired circuit judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit, State of Alabama.  The author thanks the
University of Alabama Law School Foundation for its generous support.  I also thank
Norman Greene for his leadership and tireless efforts to bring about judicial selection
reform.  I am indebted to Josh Donnelly, Scott Dunnagan, and Robert S. Elliott, who
provided significant research assistance and helpful comments.  The statements and
opinions in this article are mine alone, and naturally, I alone remain responsible for
any errors.
1. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 7 (2005).
2. I am not the first to make this statement. See Peter D. Webster, Selection and
Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (1995)
(“There is no one ‘best’ method for selection and retention of judges.”).
3. I include partisan-political, non-partisan, legislative-election, and retention or
merit-selection elections in the broad elections category.
4. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Nase, The Governor’s Impact on an Elected Judiciary:
The Lessons from Pennsylvania, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1996) (“[I]n partisan
and nonpartisan election states, most judges are initially appointed rather than
elected. . . .”) (citing scholarly writings to same effect)).
73
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comes imperative to examine appointive procedures when evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of a judicial selection process.
This Article focuses on one of the pillars of the appointive pro-
cess, the judicial nominating commission, although it warrants not-
ing both that some jurisdictions that use judicial elections also use
nominating commissions to fill vacancies, and that not all appoin-
tive systems utilize nominating commissions.5  Although this Arti-
cle eschews any analysis or discussion per se of the election
alternative,6 it suggests that all jurisdictions should have judicial
nominating commissions.  Naturally, a judicial nominating commis-
sion exists to screen and select nominees for judgeships.  In discuss-
ing nominating commissions, the self-assigned purpose of this
Article is to envision and describe a system that more likely will
result in selecting the right person for the bench.7
The task in a good judicial selection system is not simply to fill
vacancies, but to select the best candidates for judicial positions.
Short of this goal, perhaps at the very least, a well-devised system
can eliminate “seriously underqualified” candidates.8  To accom-
plish this purpose through the use of a nominating commission
scheme, we should strive to develop the ideal judicial nominating
commission system.9  That system should possess (at least) three
principal features: it should adhere to democratic ideals; it should
maintain as much independence as reasonably possible; and it
should enjoy public acceptance and support.  Additionally, local
5. For example, in Michigan, Ohio, and Texas vacancies are filled by gubernato-
rial appointment without nominating commission action. See MICH. CONST. art. VI,
§ 23; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 13; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 28(a).  In New Jersey, the
governor appoints with the advice and consent of the State Senate. See N.J. CONST.
art. VI, § 6, ¶ 1.
6. Discussion, therefore, of judicial elections generally falls outside the scope of
this Article, although at times it is necessary to mention one or more of the elective
schemes listed in note 3.
7. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, ABA, STANDARDS
ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON STATE JUDICIAL
SELECTION STANDARDS iv (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/down
loads/reformat.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (“The creation of credible, delib-
erative, non-partisan bodies to evaluate the qualifications of all judicial aspirants . . .
serves to assure the public that those judicial aspirants have met a threshold set of
qualifications.”).
8. Cf. Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability
in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 95 (1998) (“[T]he direct
primary had the unintended effect of weakening the ability of party organizations to
prevent the election of seriously underqualified judges.”).
9. We are by no means the first to make the attempt. See, e.g., MODEL JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROVISIONS (Am. Judicature Soc’y 1994), http://www.ajs.org/js/provisions.
pdf [hereinafter MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS].
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conditions and requirements must be considered in designing any
commission scheme.  Obviously, the needs of the various states and
locales differ.10  Selecting the appropriate judicial nominating com-
mission scheme can be challenging, but effective judicial nomina-
tion commissions will greatly aid in the effort to obtain the best
judges possible.
Almost needless to say, these features and considerations con-
flict to some extent.  Because of the tension between them, they
greatly complicate efforts to design an ideal commission.  Despite
these difficulties, we should not compromise on the principal fea-
tures of an ideal scheme any more than necessary to reach the best
possible balance.11  A delicate balancing of democratic ideals and
independence will garner public support for a judicial nominating
commission without over-compromising any of these core
principles.
This Article consists of five Parts.  Part I introduces the topic,
briefly explains how I was introduced to the issues being aired,12
and provides an overview of the three fundamental, principal con-
cerns discussed, namely democratic ideals, independence, and pub-
lic support.  In Part II, the Article explores the process of properly
designing a commission system.  The first section of Part II identi-
fies the goals for the appointment process and introduces the con-
cept of commission capture.  The second section of Part II focuses
on the makeup of commissions.  It examines potential sources of
authority (i.e., constitutional, statutory, or executive order) and the
strengths and weaknesses of each.  It looks at the structure of the
commission, including commissioner selection processes, and it
also addresses diversity.  In the third subdivision of Part II, the Ar-
ticle addresses the work of commissions, including guidance for
commissioners, ethics, and the judicial selection process.  In the lat-
ter subsection, the Article airs the opposing concerns of secrecy
and openness.  The fourth subpart of Part II briefly discusses the
role of commissions with regard to renomination or retention of
judges.
10. This point seemingly is overlooked occasionally. See id. pt. 1 art. __ § 2 &
Alternatives A-B (suggesting a commission composed of seven members without any
stated alternatives in light of local or state conditions or needs).
11. In almost any undertaking of this breadth, compromise is virtually guaranteed
because decision-makers disagree on the choices to be made.  With a project as im-
portant as a judicial appointment process, hopefully, compromised principles can be
kept to a minimum.
12. And leaves it to the reader to determine how that information shapes the
reader’s view of opinions expressed in the Article.
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Part III studies the challenging issue of desirable subjective at-
tributes of judicial candidates and how commissions should address
that issue.  Part IV focuses on and discusses the need to sell the
nominating commission process to the public and the political lead-
ership.  The Article’s conclusion appears in Part V.  We begin
where I began: my appointment to the trial bench.
A. My Introduction to a System (in the Interest of Candor)13
I first became acquainted with a judicial selection process in Au-
gust, 1971.  Benny H. Mize, a very prominent and well-respected
circuit judge in Alabama, had died.  His death created a mid-term
vacancy on the trial bench.  Two friends called me, then a young
attorney, to see if I could have lunch with them.  Over lunch they
told me that, as members of the governor’s local political organiza-
tion, they would be advising the governor about who should be
appointed to the vacancy and wanted my input.  We discussed my
knowledge of each of the announced candidates for the seat on the
court.
After our conversation, they asked for a copy of my resume
(which I provided) so that they could mention my name to the gov-
ernor during their meeting the next day, just in case the governor
needed to appoint someone to a board or to represent the state for
litigation purposes sometime in the future.14  The next afternoon,
after assuring the local news media that I had not received a bench
appointment,15 I received a call from the governor’s press secretary
who informed me that an Alabama state trooper was on his way to
my office with my commission as a state circuit judge.  That call
was my first communication from, to, or with anyone in the gover-
nor’s office about the matter.
Twenty years later, I served as the Chair of the Judicial Appoint-
ments Commission16 that carefully considered candidates to re-
place me upon my retirement from the active bench.  Thus, I have
seen judicial selection firsthand from both extremes.  The governor
appointed me through a very political process.  When I left office, I
13. The account of this event is as I remember it.  No records of the meeting exist
to my knowledge.
14. At the time, I already represented the state as a special assistant attorney gen-
eral in certain eminent domain proceedings for highway right-of-way condemnation
purposes.
15. An understandable response to media inquiries in light of the fact that I did
not know that I was even a candidate for the position.
16. See 1990 Ala. Laws Act 90-627 (repealed by ALA. CONST. amend. 741) (estab-
lishing a judicial nominating commission for the 6th Judicial Circuit).
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served as Chair of our judicial nominating commission, one of only
seven in the state.17  Hence, my compilation of experiences have
placed me in a unique position to critique straight appointment
versus nominating commission schemes.  Which do I think is the
better system?  Had a judicial selection commission existed locally
in 1971, I likely would not have served as a circuit judge for the
next twenty years.  Nevertheless, I think a judicial appointments
commission is an essential component of any properly designed ju-
dicial selection system, whether that system involves an elective or
appointive scheme.
B. Judicial Appointments
As noted previously, most judges originally take the bench by
appointment.18  Obviously, the quickest and most efficient way to
fill a judicial vacancy is by appointment.  Appointments are neces-
sary to maintain efficient operation of the court in the event of a
vacancy on the bench.  The death or resignation of a judge from
the active bench seriously disrupts the work of the court, and the
speedy selection of a replacement is important to the litigants and
the public.  Most, perhaps virtually all, of these interim vacancies
are filled by gubernatorial appointment.19  In a few states, the legis-
lature makes the appointment.20  Alternatively, a state could
choose a special election,21 but that method entails uncertainty, de-
lay, and costs.  Appointment is the better method of filling
vacancies.
Absent a commission, though, appointing authorities may ap-
point individuals more for their politics than for their ability.  Gov-
ernors tend to appoint individuals who have been active in state or
local politics, particularly focusing on those who have helped the
17. See ALA. CONST. amends. 83, 110, 408, 607, 615, 660, 741 (enactments estab-
lishing nominating commissions in certain counties in Alabama); 1990 Ala. Laws Act
90-627 (both provisions establishing a commission in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama).
18. See Nase, supra note 4, at 1137.
19. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 14; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 13; TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 28(a).
20. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 8, 13 (authorizing the general assembly to
elect members of the state’s courts); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
69.9:2 (West 2006) (authorizing the general assembly to fill district court judge
vacancies).
21. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2A-9(a-5) (West 2006) (requiring special
elections to fill vacancies on the state supreme court); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-25-04(3)
(2005) (authorizing the governor to appoint a judge from a list of nominees from the
judicial nominating committee, reject the list and order a new slate of nominees, or
call a special election to fill the vacancy).
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governor or the governor’s party or allies.22  Neither the guberna-
torial nor the legislative appointment process is faultless.  Both in-
volve the political process and can involve significant delay.
Moreover, neither gubernatorial nor legislative appointment
schemes necessarily accomplish our objectives, namely to create an
appointment process that adheres to democratic ideals, is indepen-
dent of the political process (as much as possible), and enjoys wide-
spread public acceptance and support.  Inserting a properly crafted
judicial nominating commission into the appointment process,
though, can greatly enhance the likelihood of meeting these objec-
tives.  These three objectives, which are vital to any properly con-
structed judicial nominating commission, are discussed in the
following subsections: i) Democratic Ideals, ii) Independence, and
iii) Public Support.
i. Democratic Ideals
A properly functioning commission system must adhere to cer-
tain democratic ideals.  Citizens must have at least some say in
their government.23  Although the judiciary is not considered a po-
litical branch, the courts are a part of our democratic form of gov-
ernment.  In fact, in this country, the courts are an essential part of
the government.  We must also recognize, frankly, that politics are
part of our governmental scheme.  Our courts impact public policy
and help shape the norms of society.24  In that sense, at the very
least, the courts are part of the political system.25
The amount of input the citizens of a state exercise with regard
to their courts varies greatly from state to state.  Citizens poten-
tially have more direct input in states with an elected judiciary and
less input in states with an appointed judiciary, but they have at
least some input in all schemes.  Some people would argue that the
22. See, e.g., Michael Solimine, Commentary: Constitutional Restrictions on the
Partisan Appointment of Federal and State Judges, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 955, 955-56
(1993) (“It has long been understood that the governor only considers for appoint-
ment a member of his or her own political party and that, in fact, all or virtually all
such appointees are members of his or her party.”).
23. There just are not enough benevolent dictators to fill the needs.
24. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY & C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, &
POLITICS 7 (4th ed. 1986) (“Because judges often affect public policy, they are impor-
tant political actors . . . .”); HENRY J. SCHMANDT, COURTS IN THE AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL SYSTEM 5 (1968) (noting that court decisions have “important political, social,
and economic consequences”).
25. See SCHMANDT, supra note 24, at 17 (“Courts are political institutions in the
sense that they participate in the authoritative allocation of values and resources for
the community or nation.”).
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courts should be removed as much as possible from politics.26  This
Article explains how judicial nominating commissions, in part,
serve that purpose, while maintaining that the commissions never-
theless must be representative and responsive to public sentiments.
Therefore, even judicial nominating commissions have a political
facet.
By utilizing a nominating commission approach, we can reduce
the concentration of power in political officeholders by spreading
the nomination and appointing powers. Political elites should not
control judicial appointments.  The courts, as part of our govern-
ment, belong to the people, and the people should have a voice in
who serves as their judges.  Judicial nominating commissions better
facilitate this input, at least at the appointment stage, without
overly politicizing judicial selection.
Within the commission process, democratic ideals are primarily
protected by the commission’s structure and procedures.  We can
further our goal of maintaining the democratic ideal by structuring
nominating commissions along democratic lines.  Thus, the size and
makeup of the commission, the commission’s openness, the com-
missioner appointment scheme, and other factors will determine
how closely the commission adheres to democratic ideals.  Addi-
tionally, canons, which require the commissioners to follow proce-
dural rules governing input the commission receives from the
public, make the commission more democratic.
Some detractors may believe that judicial nominating commis-
sions are not democratic.27  Detractors prefer a system in which
political actors, such as a governor, the legislature, or both, select
judges.  These detractors assert that the people elect these politi-
cians and therefore, this approach is more democratic than the
commission scheme.28  Despite these contentions, a system in
26. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Politics and Judicial Independence: A Proposal for
Reform of Judicial Selection in Oregon, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1425, 1429-30 (2003)
(“The appeal for bipartisanship—for putting the public interest above politics—reso-
nates at every level of government and from both political parties.”).
27. Cf., e.g., Tillman J. Finley, Note, Judicial Selection in Alaska: Justifications and
Proposed Courses of Reform, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 49, 60 (2003) (discussing merit se-
lection generally, and noting that with smaller numbers of individuals involved in judi-
cial selection comes greater potential for “secretive deals and private collaboration”).
Within Finley’s discussion of merit selection he naturally includes judicial nominating
commissions along with retention elections. See id. at 59-60.
28. See, e.g., Martha W. Barnett, The 1997-98 Florida Constitution Revision Com-
mission: Judicial Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L. REV. 411, 419 (2000) (“Judicial
nominating commissions are viewed by some as an ‘elitist’ group that ‘allows a small
handful of lawyers to decide for a community who shall be our judges.’” (quoting A.J.
Barranco, Don’t Eliminate the Right to Elect Florida’s Trial Judges, FLA. B. NEWS,
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which political actors select judges is generally not as democratic as
a system with a properly constructed judicial nominating
commission.
Looking at the approaches critically, a properly constituted judi-
cial nominating commission system is a more democratic option.
First, commissions which address trial court vacancies, as envi-
sioned in this Article, are local entities29—their membership con-
sists of local individuals.  Therefore, the commissioners can actually
be more knowledgeable about the local scene and the desires of
the local people, with regard to their courts, than a governor who
may be from, or located in, a distant city.  Additionally, the gover-
nor may be a member of, or elected by, a political party (or a fac-
tion of a political party) that is not in power on the local level.
Thus, potentially at least, it is the commission, not the governor,
that is more representative of the local court district.  The same is
true with respect to a comparison of the local commission and the
legislature.30  As representative bodies, judicial nominating com-
missions better reflect democratic ideals.  In order to operate as
democratically as possible, a commission must maintain its
independence.
ii. Independence
A commission’s function should be to identify and nominate the
most qualified individuals for judicial offices.31  To perform that
Aug. 15, 1999, at 4)); Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who’s Judging Whom? Why Popular
Elections Are Preferable to Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004)
(supporting election of judges and criticizing merit selection).  “Popular elections pro-
vide the most democratic form of judicial selection because they give citizens a direct
role in choosing the judges that represent them.  When judges are appointed by a
selection committee or by a governor, however, the citizenry is deprived of their fun-
damental right to vote and select judges.”  Olszewski, supra, at 2.
29. By local, I mean that the commission shares the geographical boundaries of
the court to which it nominates judges.  Thus, admittedly, an appellate commission for
a court of statewide jurisdiction would not be “local.”  On the other hand, in the
scheme being described, commissions that nominate to a local trial court or a district
court of appeals would be as local as the court to which it nominates judges. See, e.g.,
COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, FEERICK COM-
MISSION REPORT 7 (2004), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/Judicial
ElectionsReport.pdf [hereinafter COMM’N, FEERICK REPORT] (recommending a com-
mission for each judicial district).
30. For a different view, see Thurgood Marshall, Comments on The Missouri Plan,
Address before the American College of Trial Lawyers (Mar. 14, 1977), in MURPHY &
PRITCHETT, supra note 24, at 179 (“These [nominating] committees typically are
neither representative nor accountable bodies.”).
31. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-27-3-2(2) (West 2006) (charging the commis-
sion to submit to the governor “names of only the three (3) most highly qualified
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function, politics must be pushed to the side.  Otherwise, the com-
mission may become nothing more than a redundant step in a po-
litical process.  The commission has its own goals and functions.  It
identifies the best qualified candidates for judicial office and makes
its nominations to the appointing authority.  To perform their tasks
appropriately, judicial nominating commissions must be
independent.
Independence encompasses both external and internal indepen-
dence (explained later in a discussion of external and internal cap-
ture).32  At this juncture, suffice it to say that we seek to divide the
selection process in a way that reduces the power of individuals to
select judges.  The spread of power among a more representative
group not only is more democratic, but it can also create a signifi-
cant degree of independence.33  Thus, the commission can be a sep-
arate, worthwhile component of the selection process.  As a useful,
independent, accountable component of the judicial appointment
process, a commission scheme should garner and maintain public
support.
iii. Public Support
The commission must have the confidence and support of the
public which it serves.  A commission can gain and maintain public
support in at least three ways.  First, if the commission is represen-
tative and the commissioners are respected individuals, the public
will likely support its decisions.  Second, if the commission acts in-
dependently and engages in its selection process in a fair-minded
way, public confidence in the commission will be enhanced.  Third,
the public is much more likely to support a nominating commission
scheme if the commission is subject not only to public scrutiny, but
also to regulation, review, and in appropriate cases, sanctions.
When the people know that those in authority must answer for
their actions, it is easier for the people to support the process.
candidates”); R.I. UNIF. R. P. FOR THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’N § 5 (proposed
revision Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/
JNC/JNC_831.pdf (providing for selection of “highly qualified persons to fill each ju-
dicial vacancy”); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. app. A (West 2006) (Manual of
Procedures for Judicial Nominating Commission) [hereinafter UTAH CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL ADMIN.] (“[T]he over arching goal of the system [is] the nomination and ap-
pointment of the best qualified candidates . . . .”).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 47-56.
33. See, e.g., MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 9, at pt. 1, art.
__ § 1 Alternative A, § 1, cmt. (“The separation of functions allows for independent
and nonpartisan evaluations and nominations by a responsible commission . . . .”).
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If you read much about existing judicial nominating commis-
sions, you will see accounts of public dissatisfaction and a desire to
change commissions.34  Sometimes that dissatisfaction may be fos-
tered by political actors who want to grasp power.  The governor or
the legislature may not be satisfied with the fact that they no longer
have the ability to appoint judges.  In order to retain or regain
power, they may work against judicial nominating commissions.
Thus, to offset this possibility, judicial nominating commissions
must have public acceptance and support.
To cultivate and maintain public support, a commission can con-
duct a public relations campaign.  Possible strategies include estab-
lishing a public speakers’ bureau of commissioners (and possibly
judges and attorneys) to explain the commission’s role to inter-
ested groups, having commissioners interviewed by the media, dis-
seminating public service announcements about the commission
and its activities, and, when possible, conducting its business in
open proceedings to which the public has been invited.  Commis-
sioners can attend the meetings of other organizations such as civic
clubs and local governments to explain the commission’s function,
answer questions, and receive comments.  Such activities should
help build public confidence in the judicial nomination system.
In sum, in considering democratic ideals, independence, and the
need for public support, it appears that these goals may potentially
conflict.  Those people familiar with political science writings know
that tensions exist between judicial accountability on one hand and
independence on the other hand.35  These same tensions arise
when one addresses judicial nominating commissions.  How can
there be both independence and accountability?  Actually, within
reason, it is not an impossible task.  Both goals can be achieved if
they are recognized as goals and the commission scheme is struc-
tured insofar as possible to encompass both goals.  The system may
34. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 28; see also, e.g., The Federalist Soc’y for
Law and Pub. Policy Studies, Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Partisan
Judicial Elections (2003), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/White%20
Papers/judicialelection.htm (observing that “nominating commissions are dominated
by lawyers”); The Judicial Selection Task Force of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., Recommendations on the Selection of Judges and the Improvement of the Judicial
System in New York (2003), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/Judicial%20selec-
tion%20task%20force.pdf (“A recurring criticism of merit selection is that it is
elitist.”).
35. See, e.g., Roger Handberg, Judicial Accountability and Independence: Balanc-
ing Incompatibles?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 131 (1994) (“Balancing judicial inde-
pendence and judicial accountability has long haunted the judicial selection and
retention process at the state level.”).
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be less than perfect, but the tensions can be minimized.  Then, in
regard to the third aspect—public acceptance and support—the
task will be easier because the public will more likely support a
commission plan that is accountable, yet independent.  Hence, a
reasonable balance of these concerns—democratic ideals, indepen-
dence, and public support—should be attainable.
Each feature of a commission should be designed with these
goals in mind.  It is not enough that features of a commission
scheme garner a consensus of a drafting committee or a legislature.
Designing a commission is too important to become too much a
product of compromise, accommodation, or a path-of-least-resis-
tance approach.
II. DEVELOPING THE SYSTEM
Embracing a judicial nominating commission scheme is not
enough.  Choosing the appropriate paradigm is paramount.  As al-
ready noted, a number of states already have judicial nominating
commissions; some do not.  States with and without commissions
should take interest in the issues and suggestions encompassed in
this section.  Jurisdictions with commissions might identify oppor-
tunities to improve the existing scheme.  For example, those states
that use commissions only for either appellate or trial court vacan-
cies36 could significantly improve their commission system by ex-
panding their commissions’ jurisdiction to encompass vacancies on
all levels of courts.
Those charged with the task of forming new commissions or
modifying existing commissions inevitably have to clear significant
hurdles.  They need to make numerous choices, and many of those
choices have the potential to adversely impact the work of, and the
support for, the commissions.  This section discusses a number of
the more significant choices involved in crafting an appropriate ju-
dicial nominating commission scheme.
A. The Commission System’s Scope
States developing a new commission scheme must decide
whether they will focus solely on appellate courts or on all courts at
all levels.  Proponents of the nominating commission approach
36. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amends. 83, 110, 408, 607, 615, 660, 741 (establishing
nominating commissions for trial courts in certain counties in Alabama); MO. CONST.
art. V, § 25(a) (establishing a commission nominating process for all appellate courts
and trial courts only in the city of St. Louis and one county); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 480B.01 subdiv. 1 (West 2006) (addressing only trial courts).
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seemingly should prefer the latter, although political reality in par-
ticular states may force them to accept the former.
Presently, approximately thirty-two states have judicial nominat-
ing commissions.37  A number of states with nominating commis-
sions include both appellate and trial courts within the purview of
their commissions,38 but some states have commissions only for ap-
pellate vacancies.39  Some states may use commissions only for trial
courts,40 and a number of states do not utilize nominating commis-
sions.41  Furthermore, some states have commissions only for par-
ticular courts, such as Alabama, Arizona, and Missouri, which have
commissions for trial courts only in the larger counties.42  Regard-
less of the particular approach employed, the majority of states
have judicial nominating commissions for at least some of their
courts.  These commissions must operate within certain parameters
to best achieve a democratic ideal.
If commissions are to meet democratic ideals, they should oper-
ate within the same judicial districts as the courts for which they
are responsible.  Thus, if the appellate courts have statewide juris-
diction, a single appellate court nominating commission should
nominate applicants to fill vacancies on those courts.  If the inter-
mediate appellate courts have districts, separate nominating com-
missions should exist for those districts.  Trial court nominating
commissions should exist within the trial court’s jurisdictional
37. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS
8-12 tbl.2 (2003), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialMeritCharts.pdf.  The table lists thirty-
two states and the District of Columbia. Id.  Some commissions are for appellate
courts only; some cover only certain counties within the state. Id.  Therefore, I use
“approximately” here because the number varies as we include or exclude courts or
counties.
38. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5 (encompassing both appellate and trial
courts); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601(a) (2005) (same).
39. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. VII, § 9 (addressing appointments to the state su-
preme court and court of appeals); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (establishing a nominat-
ing commission for the state court of appeals).
40. See supra note 17 (addressing vacancies on trial courts in certain Alabama
counties); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 (pertaining to trial court vacancies).
41. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 153 (providing for gubernatorial appointment but
accommodating judicial nominating commissions in those counties with commissions);
ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 37 (permitting gubernatorial appointment of trial judges with-
out commission nomination in counties with populations under 250,000); MO. CONST.
art. V, § 25(a)-(b) (restricting commission judicial candidate nomination to the City of
St. Louis and Jackson County unless the commission scheme is adopted elsewhere by
local referendum).  Arizona and Missouri also have commissions for appellate courts.
See ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 36; MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a).  Alabama does not have a
similar commission for appellate courts. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 153.
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boundaries, whether that be a single county or some combination
of counties.
Sometimes it may not be practical to have nominating commis-
sions for every court.  For example, some states have multi-tiered
trial courts, and the jurisdictions of those courts vary.  A superior
or circuit court, for example, might operate in multiple counties,
while each of those counties might have a separate lower court of
limited jurisdiction, such as a district or county court.  It may be
more practical in those states to have a single nominating commis-
sion with authority to nominate for vacancies on both the multi-
county court and the single-county courts within the commission’s
region.
B. Designing the Appointments Commission Paradigm
i. Judicial Appointment Goals
Any judicial nominating commission should have well-defined
goals, objective standards, and reasonable discretion.  A principal
goal, of course, is to nominate the best available candidates for ju-
dicial office.  Other goals, such as diversity, also may exist.  How-
ever that goal is defined, though, challenges will exist.  Aside from
the obvious fact that the best candidates for judicial office may be
either uninterested or unavailable,43 identification of the best can-
didates can further frustrate the process.  The problems regarding
identifying the best available candidates will be explored later in
Part III of this Article, which discusses the desirable traits of
candidates.
Commission objectives and standards may be stated in a stat-
ute44 or a handbook.45  Alternatively, the commission can identify
43. Despite our goal to obtain the best judges possible, we must recognize that the
best individuals may not be available, so we are left with the “best available candi-
dates.”  Many reasons may exist why individuals choose not to become candidates.
They may view their present position as more desirable than a judgeship.  They may
not like the prospect of public life, the nomination-appointment process, the potential
loss of income, or the need to engage in a retention or reelection process.
44. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-27-3-2(a) (West 2006) (listing seven considera-
tions for commission evaluation in writing); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 8
(requiring commission to consider eight “qualifications” for office, including judicial
temperament and community service); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-811.01 (2005) (stating
seven considerations and authorizing supreme court promulgation of additional fac-
tors); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-1A-app. II at 3 (2006) (listing twenty-five criteria in
three categories, including personal attributes, competency and experience, and judi-
cial capabilities); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601(d) (2005) (stating factors including so-
cial consciousness and public service).
45. Model handbooks exist. See, e.g., MARIA N. GREENSTEIN, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS (Kathleen M. Samp-
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them in an organizational meeting.  Regardless of the method
used, clear, specific objectives should be stated and readily availa-
ble.46  Additionally, commissioners should be well acquainted with,
and strive to meet, those objectives.  Having well-defined objec-
tives and standards should enhance predictability without stifling a
commission’s independence or spontaneity.
Standards guide, rather than dictate, results.  Commissioners
must nominate at the end of the evaluation process.  Therefore,
they need a practical system that will facilitate this process while
providing flexibility.  Just because commissioners rely on standards
to achieve uniformity in implementing criteria does not mean that
these standards dictate a particular result in the ultimate candidate
rankings.  In the end, commissioners must exercise reasonable dis-
cretion in their choices.  In other words, standards notwithstanding,
commissioners should retain some degree of principled discretion
in their decision-making process.
ii. Combating Commission Capture
For commissioners to exercise their discretion fully and have a
real voice in the nomination process, the commission must be free
of control from external and internal individuals or entities.  A
commission that operates under the dominance of individuals or
entities is neither independent nor accountable.  Moreover, if other
entities control a commission, it likely is destined to lose public
support for its actions.
In the interest of promoting accountability, independence, and
public confidence, any system establishing or maintaining a judicial
nominating commission must include safeguards against both ex-
ternal and internal capture.  As used in this Article, capture does
not equate “agency capture” as used in economic theory.  Agency
capture occurs if the entity being monitored actually captures the
son rev. ed., 2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/materials.htm [hereinafter
GREENSTEIN, AJS HANDBOOK]; ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, PROCEDURES FOR
NOMINATING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES (2005), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/se-
lection/Procedures/SelectionProcedures10-3-05.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, NOMINATING PROCEDURES]; UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., supra note
31, at app. A.  These materials contain information about the process, evaluative crite-
ria that commissioners should consider, and guidelines for legal compliance when un-
dertaking their duties as commissioners.
46. In addition to the evaluative criteria contained in the AJS Handbook, GREEN-
STEIN, AJS HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at ch. 5, the American Bar Association has
published standards on state judicial selection. See ABA STANDARDS supra note 7.
These standards state the ABA’s view of appropriate judicial qualifications, including
evaluative criteria for the nominating process. Id. pt. A, Standard A 1.
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administrative agency charged with conducting the monitoring.47
Once agency capture occurs, the administrative agency favors the
industry or entity it is charged with overseeing.48  Commission cap-
ture, though, differs significantly from agency capture.  Commis-
sion capture occurs in either of two ways (neither of which involves
a regulated entity gaining control over the commission): a) an ex-
ternal individual or entity gains control over the commission (i.e.,
external capture); or b) some subset of commissioners control the
commission (i.e., internal capture).
Because commissioners must be appointed or elected, a commis-
sioner may be controlled, or at least greatly influenced, by the indi-
vidual or group that selected the commissioner.  External capture
occurs when any outside agency, entity, organization, or individual
unduly influences the decision-making process of either individual
commissioners (i.e., partial capture) or, even more problematic, the
commission (i.e., full capture).
The most blatant, but certainly not the only, example of external
capture is a system in which the governor appoints commissioners
to the judicial nominating commission, the commission nominates
applicants for judicial positions, and the governor appoints the
judges.49  This scheme reeks of redundancy and inefficiency. In
such scenarios, the governor actually controls the commission.50  If
so, why the bureaucracy?  If the public wants the governor to con-
47. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34, 34 (1993) (“Since the 1950s, commentators have been con-
cerned about the ‘capture’ of administrative agencies by the industries they
regulate.”).
48. See, e.g., id. at 34 n.1 (“‘An agency is captured when it favors the concerns of
the industry it regulates, which is well-represented by its trade groups and lawyers,
over the interests of the general public, which is often unrepresented.’” (quoting
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 1.7.2 (2d ed.
1992))).  There is a wealth of scholarly writings about agency capture.  See, e.g., id.
(listing articles that discuss agency capture).
49. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 118 (providing that the governor appoints the four lay
members of the seven person commission, and also appoints nominees to court vacan-
cies); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 2(a) (empowering the governor to appoint
seven of nine at-large commissioners “who serve at the pleasure of the governor”);
see also Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, § 1.4.5 (2006), http://www.mass.gov/jnc/JNC%20-
%20Executive%20Order%20470%20(02.03.2006).pdf [hereinafter Mass. Exec. Order
No. 470] (providing that “all Commissioners serve a one-year term at the pleasure of
the Governor and may be removed without cause”).  In Massachusetts, the governor
appoints judges with the advice and consent of the Governor’s Council. See MASS.
CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. IX.
50. Similarly, if the bar association selects a majority of the commission, the com-
mission may not be independent of the bar.  This could occur, for example, if trial or
defense attorneys, or Democrats or Republicans, dominate the bar.  Under such cir-
cumstances, the dominant influence would flow through the election process and re-
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trol the process, why not simply let the governor appoint judges
and forego the complexity of a captured-commission scheme?  If a
nominating commission is to be an effective step in the judicial se-
lection process, the commission must be relatively independent of
other forces in the government.
It must be noted, though, that keeping the commission indepen-
dent from the appointing authority presents challenges.  A jurisdic-
tion seeking to institute a commission process should expect those
in power to seek to remain in power.51  Governors (or legislators)
who appoint judges are not likely to favor surrendering a virtually
unfettered judicial-appointment prerogative.  Similarly, reformers
in jurisdictions with nominating commissions may meet resistance
from political actors or groups if they attempt to strengthen an ex-
isting commission.  Thus, for example, if a commission’s nomina-
tions are subject to gubernatorial veto (i.e., a weak commission), it
is unlikely that the governor will enthusiastically support a reme-
dial measure to remove the governor’s veto power.52
There seems to be a view that the governor (or legislature) pos-
sesses the constitutionally bestowed power to appoint judges and
the nominating commission is merely a means to that end.53  Nev-
ertheless, although the appointment power may rest ultimately
sult in nominations of judicial candidates who are unduly beholden or partial to the
dominant group in the bar association.
51. As Daniel Webster reportedly observed: “There are men in all ages who mean
to govern well, but they mean to govern.  They promise to be good masters, but they
mean to be masters.”  Quote DB, http://www.quotedb.com/authors/daniel-webster
(last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
52. Compare ALA. CONST. amend. 741, § 6(f) (providing that the nominating com-
mission must submit another list of nominees if the governor fails to appoint from
original list) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 1 (“If the governor declines to
select a nominee to fill the vacancy from the list of nominees, . . . the governor may
select a person to fill the vacancy without regard to the commission’s recommenda-
tion.”), with ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 37(C) (providing that the chief justice of the
supreme court shall appoint from the list of nominees if the governor does not make
the appointment within sixty days of receipt of the nominations), MONT. CONST. art.
VII, § 8 (providing that the chief justice of the supreme court shall appoint from the
list of nominees if the governor does not make the appointment within thirty days),
and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3009(a) (2005) (providing that the chief justice of the su-
preme court shall appoint from the list of nominees if the governor does not make the
appointment within sixty days of receipt of the nominations).
53. Cf., e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25, 29-30 (Fla.
1973) (“The appointment of a judge is an executive function and the screening of
applicants which results in the nomination of those qualified is also an executive func-
tion . . . .  Once the judicial nominating commissions have been established by the
Legislature they become a part of the executive branch of government.  The function
of the commissions being inherently an executive function, such cannot be limited by
legislative action.”).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ104.txt unknown Seq: 17 12-APR-07 9:06
2007] RETHINKING NOMINATING COMMISSIONS 89
with the governor or the legislature, the nominating power is be-
stowed by law on the commission.  Permitting the governor (or the
legislature) to appoint both commissioners and judges nominated
by those commissioners significantly raises the risk of external cap-
ture by the appointing authority.  Even if the governor or legisla-
ture appoints the commissioners, however, the risk of external
capture by the appointing authority can be lessened somewhat by
prohibiting: a) the reappointment of a commissioner, or b) alterna-
tively, consecutive terms for a commissioner,54 or c) appointment
of a commissioner to a judgeship during or shortly after the expira-
tion of her term of office.55  By prohibiting such potential rewards,
commissioners have less reason to appease the appointing author-
ity.  Unfortunately, even this approach does not entirely eliminate
external pressure.  The appointing authority could always substi-
tute an appointment to another desirable position such as a posi-
tion on a university board of trustees, a local civil service board, or
a governor’s advisory committee on a subject of interest to the par-
ticular commissioner as a reward for favorable action as a
commissioner.
Another way to reduce the possibility of external capture is to
set a longer term of office for commissioners.  If terms are fixed at,
say, six years rather than two years, appointing authorities obvi-
ously would appoint commissioners less frequently.  Thus, commis-
sioners less likely would be reappointed as a reward for favorable
action because the appointing authority would also change over
time.  For example, many governors are elected for only four-year
terms.
External capture, though, is not our sole concern.  Within the
commission itself, the possibility of capture exists if a group of
commissioners actually dictates the commission’s actions.  Because
54. Some jurisdictions prohibit consecutive terms of nominating commissions.
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 36; IOWA CONST. art. V, § 16; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-
27-2-5 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-12-102 to -103 (West 2006).
55. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 6 (restricting commissioners
from appointment to a district judgeship during their term of office on the commis-
sion and for one year thereafter); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-25-07 (2005) (barring com-
missioners from judicial appointment candidacy during term on nominating
committee); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2 (2005) (providing commissioners are ineligible
for judicial nomination during term and for one year after service on commission);
Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, supra note 49, § 1.4.1 (barring eligibility for judicial office
for commissioners and their immediate family during service as commissioners and
for three years after service); see also MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS,
supra note 9, at pt. 1, art. __ § 2 Alternatives A-B (barring appointment of commis-
sioners to judicial office during their term on the commission and a period of either
three or four years thereafter).
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no entity should dominate commission action or operations, the
commission must also be internally independent and accountable.
Internal capture exists when a particular group dictates the com-
mission’s actions or outvotes all other groups on a regular basis.56
For example, if enough of the commissioners are attorneys who
specialize in civil litigation, the applications of criminal or domes-
tic-relations practitioners may receive short shrift.  Likewise, if
enough of the commissioners, whether lay or law-trained, belong to
a particular political party, judicial applicants belonging to other
parties may not receive favorable treatment.
The problems associated with internal and external capture elu-
cidate the importance of independent nominating commissions.  To
ensure their independence, two things are necessary: 1) commis-
sioner appointments must be structured in a way to defeat domi-
nance by any appointing agency or individual; and, 2) the
commission nomination process must negate the possibility of
small-group dominance.  Proponents of the nominating commis-
sion paradigm seek to reduce political influences in the selection of
judges and reinforce public confidence in the judiciary.  Making
commissioners independent of the appointing authority is a logical,
and arguably essential, starting point.
An independent nominating commission will reduce political in-
fluences and reinforce confidence in the selection process.  Com-
missioners may regulate their activities, and always act with the
best interest of the public and the judiciary in mind.  Nevertheless,
a system structured to reduce the chance that agendas, biases, or
political ties will control the commission’s actions will lessen the
need to rely on the integrity of individual commissioners.  If no
faction, built on political, professional, socio-economic, ethnic, or
other factors, possesses enough votes to make nominations without
consideration of the positions of other commissioners, the commis-
sioners more likely will identify better-qualified candidates capable
of garnering support from the other commissioners.  Such a process
should better serve the goal of selecting individuals who are well-
qualified and impartial.
The well-constructed system would include a collage of charac-
teristics that many jurisdictions use to ensure independence.  First,
the number of commissioners would be determined in part based
upon the need to have a distribution of power among the commis-
56. An ad hoc coalition of subgroups in favor of or against a particular candidate
would not constitute commission capture, which as defined requires commission
dominance.
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sioners.  Second, a number of appointing authorities would appoint
commissioners, thereby ensuring that no one individual has control
over the commission or commissioners.  Spreading power among a
number of people, whether appointing authorities or commission-
ers, makes cooperation, consideration, and compromise among
commissioners more likely, thus strengthening the system.
The commission system is also strengthened if commissioners are
appointed or elected by someone other than the same person who
appoints judges.  For example, if the governor appoints judges to
vacancies, the governor should not also appoint the judicial nomi-
nating commission.  This spread of powers prevents the accumula-
tion of too much power in a single person or entity.  Collateral
benefits may also arise.  For example, this fracturing would likely
raise the commission’s image in the public’s view and, in the same
stroke, promote diversity of both commissioners and judicial
nominees.
Avoiding internal capture may be a more difficult proposition
than preventing external capture.  An imbalance of power on the
commission may arise even though the selection process is diluted
and diverse.  Nevertheless, the safeguards adopted to prevent ex-
ternal capture should help avoid internal capture, at least in part,
through the distribution of the power to appoint commissioners
among different appointing authorities.
C. Makeup of the Commission
A commission’s work and productivity are greatly affected by
the source of its authority as well as its makeup.  The concerns of
independence, accountability, and public support are also signifi-
cantly affected by the commission’s makeup.  These two realiza-
tions illustrate part of why it is so important to properly structure
any commission to the needs and idiosyncrasies of each jurisdic-
tion.  As introductorily stated, there is no one way to best select
judges.  The source of authority, structure, and diversity of the
commission must reflect characteristics unique to the jurisdiction in
order to maintain independence and public support.  The exact
composition of any commission is fraught with meticulous choices
that prove to be the breeding ground of compromise.  This Article
cannot stress enough that the selection of judges is one of the most
important decisions that a society makes.  Commissions should en-
hance our ability to select outstanding judges.  The constitution of
a commission must be directed at furthering that function while
preserving independence, accountability, and public support.
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i. Source of Authority for the Commission Structure
Constitutional provisions, statutes, or executive orders may es-
tablish nominating commissions.  Each of these possibilities has ad-
vantages and disadvantages.  Commissions established by
constitutional provision are less vulnerable to political change, but
are nevertheless potentially vulnerable.  If momentum for change
arises, legislation may modify or even eliminate the commission,
even though the commission was created by a constitutional
amendment.  Due to the difficulty in enacting constitutional
amendments, though, the commission is reasonably protected
against retaliatory action or politically motivated changes.  On the
other hand, it is more difficult to modify a commission scheme cre-
ated by constitutional provision, should a need to modify arise, be-
cause a constitutional provision requires a concerted and continued
effort to effect change.  It also requires substantial public support
and a marshaling of forces for the proposed change.
Commissions created by statute are more vulnerable to politi-
cally motivated changes or retaliatory action because they can be
modified by legislative action without the need for a constitutional
amendment.  Thus, if a commission’s list of nominees fails to meet
the expectations of the appointing authority or some other political
actor, such as a legislator, the legislation establishing the commis-
sion may be amended, or the authorization for the commission may
be repealed.  Commissions based on statutes, therefore, are less in-
dependent than those created by constitutional provisions.
Consider, for example, the changes made to the commission for
the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Alabama.  At the time I chaired the
commission, a statute57 empowered our commission to nominate
from three to five legally qualified candidates for each judicial va-
cancy.  The statute required the governor to choose a judge from
those nominees within sixty days of the receipt of the slate of can-
didates.  If the governor did not act within sixty days, the chief jus-
tice made the appointment.  Because both the governor and the
chief justice in Alabama are elected officials, it was possible that
they would be from different political parties,58 but, even if they
57. See 1990 Ala. Laws Act 90-627 (repealed by ALA. CONST. amend. 741).  Al-
though the governor possesses constitutional power to appoint judges, the constitu-
tion was amended to give counties a local option to create judicial commissions, and
thereby modify the governor’s constitutionally established power to appoint judges.
See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 153.
58. This was the situation in 1993-1995 and 1999-2003 in which James E. Folsom,
Jr., and Don Siegelman, both Democrats, served as Governor of Alabama.  During
both terms, the chief justice was a Republican.
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were from the same party, they would not necessarily have been
political allies59 or even acquaintances.
Subsequently, in 2002, a new constitutional amendment—repeal-
ing the statute and creating a new commission—was passed.60  Sev-
eral stringent aspects of the legislation creating the commission
were excised.  The amendment gave the governor the power to
veto the submitted list of nominees, and repealed the residual
power of the chief justice to appoint judges if the governor failed to
do so within sixty days.61  These changes greatly weakened the judi-
cial nominating commission.  The statute created an independent
commission; the constitutional amendment almost eviscerated it.
Although the new model retains an independent commission with
regard to appointment of commissioners, currently the commission
is not nearly as independent because the governor has more power,
directly or indirectly, in the process.  Thus, as this example demon-
strates, commissions are subject to political forces and changes.
Commissions also may be created by executive order in some
states,62 but these commissions are particularly vulnerable if the
governor is unsatisfied with the process or completes her term of
office.  There is no guarantee that a successor will enforce or ex-
tend the order.  Of course, strength of executive orders flows from
the fact that the governor, as the appointing authority, can agree to
utilize a nominating commission without the need for legislative
agreement or action.  Additionally, executive orders can be imple-
mented rather quickly.
ii. Structure
Two issues arise concerning the structure of a commission: First,
who selects the commissioners, and are they appointed or elected?
Second, what is the optimal size for a commission?
a. Selection of Commissioners
As is evident from the foregoing discussion of commission cap-
ture, one particularly challenging aspect of creating a commission
scheme is identifying the appropriate manner of selecting commis-
sioners and determining who should serve on the judicial nominat-
59. For example, Governor Bob Riley and former Chief Justice Roy Moore were
not political allies during the time both held political office, and, in 2006, they were
opponents in the Republican primary for the position of Governor of Alabama.
60. See ALA. CONST. amend. 741.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, supra note 49, § 1.0 (establishing a state
judicial nominating commission).
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ing commission.  Typically, commissions are composed of attorneys
and lay-persons.63  In some jurisdictions, judges also serve as com-
missioners.64  Other jurisdictions prohibit commissioners from
holding public office during their service on the commission.65
States with unified bars have an easier task in designing a selec-
tion process for the attorney members of commissions.  The bar in
these states could simply elect the attorneys who will serve as com-
missioners.  To ensure diversity (in its broadest sense), various
seats on the commission can be designated for particular specialties
or types of practice.  For example, the bar could elect attorneys
who practice as civil (divided among plaintiff and defense), crimi-
nal (divided among prosecution and defense), or domestic relations
litigators.  Alternatively, the bar leadership could appoint the at-
torney members of the commission, but election of bar representa-
tives to nominating commissions is more democratic.
In states without unified bars, the selection process is more prob-
lematic.  The number of independent bar associations will greatly
complicate the selection scheme in some locales.  An alternative
would be to allow all attorneys who practice in the court’s jurisdic-
tional area to vote for attorney candidates for commission seats
regardless of the voters’ bar memberships.
Non-lawyer members of commissions commonly are appointed
by governors.66  A more democratic approach involves authorizing
the local legislative delegation to appoint the lay commissioners.
That approach diverts the power from the governor, who usually
will be charged with appointing judges from the slate nominated by
the commission.  Placing the power to appoint or elect commission-
ers in hands other than the appointing authority for judges better
63. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 741; HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 4; IND. CONST. art.
7, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 4(a).
64. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 741 (naming presiding (chief) circuit judge as ex
officio member of the commission); IND. CONST. art. 7, § 9 (providing that the state
chief justice or another designated judge serves ex officio as chair of the appellate
nominating commission); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (designating several judges as ex
officio members of appellate nominating commission). But see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 43.291(b)(2) (West 2006) (banning judges from membership on nominating
commissions).
65. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-44a(a) (West 2006) (“None of the mem-
bers shall be an elected or appointed official of the state or hold state-wide office in a
political party.”). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.291(b)(2) (permitting commissioners
to hold non-judicial public offices).
66. See, e.g., MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 9, at pt. 1, art.
__ § 2 Alternatives A-B (providing for gubernatorial appointment of lay members of
the commission, subject to senate confirmation).
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addresses both democratic ideals and commission-independence
concerns.
Additionally, the selection process for commissioners should be
relatively open.  Individuals interested in serving on nominating
commissions should have the opportunity to apply for vacancies on
the commissions.  Thus, information regarding the vacancy should
be easily obtainable.  To accomplish this goal, the vacancy and de-
tails about the application process should be publicized throughout
the state or district from which the appointment will be made.67
This should occur whenever there is a vacancy.  Moreover, the ap-
pointment schedule should allow adequate time for applicants to
apply and be considered for appointment.  This approach keeps the
process more democratic.
b. Size of the Commission
In creating a commission scheme, size does matter.  Our con-
cerns of democratic ideals, independence, and public support all
potentially affect the commission’s optimum size.68  Other consid-
erations, however, do exist.  A statewide commission that nomi-
nates appellate court judges probably should be larger than a local
commission charged with nominating trial judges.  This is not be-
cause one level of the courts is more important than the other, but
because a larger commission may be necessary if it is to be repre-
sentative.  If the entire state is to be represented by members of
the commission drawn from districts or regions of the state, the
number of districts may require a larger commission.  Additionally,
the public may be more willing to surrender the nominating role to
a larger, more diverse and representative commission.  On the lo-
cal level, though, a smaller commission may be able to represent
the county, circuit, or district adequately.
iii. Diversity
The membership of a judicial nominating commission must be
diverse; in other words, it must be inclusive.69  Promoting diversity
67. See, e.g., id. at pt. 2, R. __.07 cmt. (noting that the process for appointing com-
missioners “should be open and accessible”).
68. See id. at pt. 1, art. __ § 2 Alternatives A-B (suggesting a commission com-
posed of seven members).
69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.291(4) (requiring the governor “to the extent
possible” to ensure racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, as well as geographic distribu-
tion); Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, supra note 49, § 1.1 (providing that to “the extent
practicable, the Commissioners shall reflect diversity of race, gender, ethnicity, geog-
raphy and, among Commissioners who are also members of the bar, various practice
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in the membership of a commission ensures that the body is inclu-
sive, which fosters public acceptance and promotes democratic ide-
als.  Although easy to support, diversity may be difficult to attain.
First, diversity must be defined.  Is racial or gender representation
sufficient to establish diversity, or should diversity also address
other demographic, political, socioeconomic, geographic, or profes-
sional differentiations?  For example, should we balance commis-
sion membership with regard to political party membership, legal
specializations, or geographic representation?
Some commissions are rather small entities of five to nine per-
sons,70 so a truly diverse commission may become more difficult.
For example, in appointing or electing a five-person commission,
the path to ensuring representation of lay citizens, attorneys (in-
cluding various specialties), minorities, and women, becomes a lab-
yrinth.  Moreover, in the case of some district commissions, the
district itself may not be very diverse and a commission that mir-
rors the commission’s population may appear to lack diversity.
Statutes can establish specific diversity criteria, but such provi-
sions—essentially quotas—pose a number of other problems.
They limit the pool of prospective commissioners, disqualifying
some highly qualified prospects for reasons not logically tied to
their qualifications and perhaps provide over-representation to
less-interested or even disinterested groups.
Constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules may seek to establish
diversity across one or more of five categories.  In such laws, com-
missioners are required to be either members of the bar or lay citi-
zens,71 members of particular legal specialty groups,72 members of
areas and size of practice”); MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 9,
at pt. 1, art. __ § 2, to Alternative A-B (providing that “[a]ll appointing authorities
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substantially reflects the
gender, ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction”).
70. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amends. 83, 660 (providing for a commission of five
members); KY. CONST. § 118(2) (providing for a commission of seven members); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 43.291(1)(a)-(b) (providing for a commission of nine members); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2 (2005) (same).
71. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 741(a) (providing for a nine-member commis-
sion composed of one judge, one prosecutor, four attorneys, and three lay citizens);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-27-2-1 (West 2006) (providing for three lay and three attorney
commissioners); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 (West 2006) (providing for specific lim-
its on the number of attorneys on the commission but permitting a majority of com-
missioners to be attorneys).
72. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 741(a) (providing that the practicing bar shall
be represented by five attorneys, one each of whom shall be “substantially engaged”
in plaintiff civil practice, defense civil practice, domestic relations practice, and crimi-
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political parties,73 residents of certain geographic areas,74 or mem-
bers of certain racial, gender, or ethnic groups.75  Rather than ad-
dressing the specifics, some states simply admonish appointing
authorities to consider diversity in making appointments to nomi-
nating commissions.76  Others, it seems, make no such demands.77
Both attorneys and the lay public should be represented on nom-
inating commissions to ensure that they have a voice in judicial
selection while providing socioeconomic and industrial diversity.
The courts belong to the people; attorneys bring their unique expe-
rience and intense interest to the nominating process.  Jurisdic-
tions, though, should take care to ensure that the factions of the
legal community are adequately represented.  If the law-trained
members of the commission are elected by the unified bar of a dis-
nal defense practice; the district attorney serves ex officio, as does the presiding
(chief) circuit judge).
73. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (requiring equal representation of “the two
largest major political parties”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-44a(a) (West 2006)
(“Not more than six of the members shall belong to the same political party.”); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 34.010(2)-(3) (West 2006) (requiring equal representation from
the two major political parties).
74. See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. V,  § 16 (“Due consideration shall be given to area
representation in the appointment and election of judicial nominating commission
members.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-2101(1) (2005) (“Appointments shall be made
with due consideration of area representation and not more than three (3) of the
permanent appointed members shall be from one (1) political party.”); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-27-2-1(d) to -2(c) (requiring commissioners to reside in the district they
represent).
75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.291(4) (requiring the governor “to the extent
possible” to ensure racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, as well as geographic distribu-
tion); IOWA CODE ANN. § 46.1 (West 2006) (“No more than a simple majority of the
members appointed shall be of the same gender.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2(a)(3)
(2005) (“The governor and the nominating authorities hereunder shall exercise rea-
sonable efforts to encourage racial, ethnic, and gender diversity within the commis-
sion.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(b)(2) (West 2006) (“If the nominees do not
reflect the diversity of the state’s population, the speaker shall reject the entire list of
a group and require the group to resubmit its list of nominees.”).
76. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 2(e) (“The appointing authori-
ties shall ensure that the permanent members of the commission include women and
minorities.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2(a)(3) (“The governor and the nominating
authorities hereunder shall exercise reasonable efforts to encourage racial, ethnic, and
gender diversity within the commission.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10(C) (2005) (“In
making appointments to the commission, race, gender, national origin, and other
demographic factors should be considered to ensure nondiscrimination to the greatest
extent possible as to all segments of the population of the State.”).
77. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-25-02 (2005) (providing for the appointment
of a nine-person nominating commission without any stated requirement of diversity
or consideration of diversity other than requiring appointment of both members of
the bar and non-attorneys).  Of course, diversity may be addressed in North Dakota
by another provision of law or custom, but it is not mentioned in the section gov-
erning the appointment of commissioners.
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trict or state,78 it is quite possible that some legal specialties, such
as criminal prosecutors or domestic-relations specialists, will be
under-represented unless the rules require such representation.79
The lay community should also be represented because local inter-
ests and individuals are greatly affected by the makeup of the judi-
ciary.  The lay community may represent different regions of the
jurisdiction, businesses, as well as different socioeconomic and eth-
nic groups.  It is essential to democratic ideals that as many people
as possible are afforded a chance to voice their opinions.
Some jurisdictions divide seats by political party to ensure a bal-
ance of political representation.80  Actually, though, attempting to
balance the representation of political parties by awarding each
party an equal (or nearly equal) number of seats on the commis-
sion may well result in overrepresentation.  For example, if the law
requires a minimum of four members from each of the major par-
ties (Democrat and Republican) on a nine-person commission,
members of rival parties and independents must vie for the remain-
ing seat regardless of their percentage of the population.  Another
example would be a provision that requires a fifty-fifty or sixty-
forty split in a district where seventy-five to eighty percent of the
voters belong to one party.
Regardless of whether the commission itself is diverse, it can be
charged with the duty to consider diversity in its nominating pro-
cess.  More diversity on the commission, though, would possibly
lead to more diversity in nominations.
D. Work of the Commissions
i. Establishing Procedures and Developing Guidance
Providing training and guidance to commissioners is essential for
the proper functioning of a nominating commission.  Stated suc-
cinctly, before commissioners set about to nominate candidates for
judicial office, they should be briefed on the role of the commis-
sion, educated about the desired characteristics of judicial candi-
dates, provided with objective criteria and a structured process for
78. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 118 (“Two members of each commission shall be mem-
bers of the bar, who shall be elected by their fellow members.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4,
§ 601(b)(4) (2005) (authorizing attorneys admitted to practice before the state su-
preme court to elect three members to the nominating board).
79. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 741 (assigning one seat on the commission to
the local district attorney and authorizing the local bar to elect the remaining attor-
ney-commissioners).
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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selecting judges, and instructed on state and federal law with re-
gard to permissible interview practices.  Some jurisdictions do train
commissioners;81 others supply handbooks,82 rules,83 or statutory
guidance.84
ii. Ethics of Commissioners
It would be naive to believe that all commissioners would always
act ethically and legally absent consequences for misconduct.85
Therefore, any commission should operate under statutory direc-
tions, a code of conduct, and an oath.86  Providing statutory gui-
dance and an ethics code, though, is insufficient without a process
for enforcing the statutes and code.  The commission’s role and
identified goals help shape an appropriate code of conduct for judi-
cial nominating commissions.  A logical starting point for creating a
code of conduct for commissioners is to determine the types of
conduct to permit or prohibit.  The code must both inform commis-
sioners of appropriate conduct and proscribe inappropriate
activities.
To provide this guidance, the code must be tailored to the work
of commissioners. A code can take the form of general canons,
much like the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Conduct
that is applicable to judges in a number of states.  Thus, commis-
81. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, INSTITUTE FOR NOMINATING COMMISSION-
ERS, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, FACILITATOR’S GUIDE 1 (2005), available at http://www
.ajs.org/js/AJS_JudNomEduHandbook.pdf (“The Institute for Judicial Nominating
Commissioners is a one-day program covering key steps in the commission process,
which can range from an initial organizational meeting to submitting names to the
appointing authority.”).
82. See supra sources cited note 45.
83. See, e.g., HAW. JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’N R., [hereinafter HAW. JUDICIAL
SELECTION COMM’N R.] available at http://www.hawaii.gov/jud/ctrules/jscr.htm (last
visited Jan. 11, 2007); R.I. UNIFORM R. P. FOR THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’N
§ IV (proposed revision Oct. 29, 2001), [hereinafter R.I. UNIFORM R.P. FOR THE
NOMINATING COMM’N] available at http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/
JNC/JNC_831_.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
84. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-27-3-2(a) (West 2006) (providing statutory gui-
dance to commissioners for nominating process).
85. Nevertheless, we always can hope. See HAW. JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’N
R., supra note 83, pmbl. (“Judicial selection commissioners hold positions of public
trust and shall conduct themselves in a manner which reflects credit upon the judicial
selection process.”).  But Hawaii does not rest on platitudes—Rule 5 sets forth a code
of conduct for commissioners. See id. R. 5 (setting forth a code of conduct for com-
mission members).
86. An oath impresses the obligations of the office on the commissioners as they
assume a position of trust.  Oaths are required by statute in some jurisdictions. See,
e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2(h) (2005).
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sioners should be persons of integrity87 who avoid inappropriate
conduct.88  For example, commissioners would have to refrain from
incompatible political activities89 both as individuals and commis-
sioners.  Inappropriate considerations such as public criticism or
the possibility of political rewards should not sway commission-
ers.90  They should limit their non-commission activities insofar as
those activities might conflict with their role as commissioners.91
Moreover, they should be diligent and impartial in their work,92
and they should refrain from discussing confidential commission
facts with others.93  If their impartiality is impaired or questionable,
they should remove themselves from the deliberative process.94
Although a newly drafted code of ethics for commissioners could
address these concerns, it would be quicker and easier simply to
modify—and apply the modified version of—the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Conduct to judicial nominating
commissions.
The commission needs to be open to, and receptive of, external
input.  Rules of conduct should help reduce political control, not
eliminate public input.  Nevertheless, a code of ethics must address
the external pressures that may exert themselves upon the commis-
sioners.  Political pressure may come from individuals, political
parties, and industry and special interest groups that exist within
the constituency.  Commissioners should receive information from
constituents, whether those constituents speak individually or col-
lectively through organizations.  Such information, however,
should be properly channeled to the commission as an entity and
87. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2000) (“A judge shall up-
hold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.”).
88. Id. Canon 2 (“A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impro-
priety in all of the judge’s activities.”).
89. Id. Canon 5 (“A judge . . . shall refrain from inappropriate political activity.”).
90. Id. Canon 3(B)(2) (“A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public
clamor or fear of criticism.”).
91. Id. Canon 4 (“A judge shall so conduct the judge’s extra-judicial activities as to
minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations.”).
92. Id. Canon 3(B)(5) (“A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or
prejudice.”); id. Canon 3(B)(8) (“A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters
promptly, efficiently and fairly.”).
93. Id. Canon 3(B)(11) (“A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unre-
lated to judicial duties, nonpublic information acquired in a judicial capacity.”).
94. Id. Canon 3(E)(1) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding
in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”); see also
Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 744 (2001) (“The
appearance of propriety is as important as the absence of impropriety.”).
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not to individual commissioners by way of surreptitious meetings
or ex parte communications.
External pressures are not the only concern.  The commission
should not be subject to the individual political opinions, biases, or
prejudices of the commissioners. Thus, for example, a commis-
sioner should not use her position to either promote the nomina-
tion of a friend or colleague to the bench, or derail the candidacy of
others because of racial, gender, or other inappropriate considera-
tions.  Commissioners should discharge their duties in much the
same manner that the judges they nominate should perform their
judicial functions.
If commissioners fail to abide by applicable ethics rules, they
should be subject to discipline through an enforcement process.
The enforcement process should constitute a two-tiered approach.
In the two-tiered scheme, complaints could be filed with an investi-
gatory board.  If, after investigation, the inquiry board finds the
complaint warrants prosecution, an investigatory body could refer
the case to a hearing board.  The enforcement process is essential
for the effectiveness of any ethics code.  The enforcement process
must operate properly.  As in any selection process, some candi-
dates will not be selected.  Those who fail to gain a nomination
might be disgruntled and, therefore, prone to file complaints.  The
two-tiered approach provides a system that mandates compliance
on the part of commissioners and provides consequences for infrac-
tions. It also ensures that enforcement arises only when justified
and, even then, that it is applied in a measured and informed
fashion.
Some states already have such entities in place for judicial over-
sight.  For example, Alabama95 and Pennsylvania96 utilize investi-
gatory bodies that receive and investigate complaints against
judges.  Similarly, these states have entities to hear those com-
plaints that the investigatory bodies file against judges.  In Ala-
bama, the hearing body is the Court of the Judiciary;97 in
Pennsylvania, it is the Court of Judicial Discipline.98
In Delaware, the process works somewhat differently.  The
Court of the Judiciary receives the complaints.99  After initial
95. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 156 (establishing the Judicial Inquiry Commission).
96. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a) (establishing the Judicial Conduct Board).
97. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 157 (establishing the Court of the Judiciary).
98. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b) (establishing the Court of Judicial Discipline).
99. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37 (establishing the Court of the Judiciary).
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screenings by the clerk and the Chief Justice,100 complaints deemed
worthy of investigation are referred to panels of the Preliminary
Investigatory Committee.101  Although all of these systems possess
pros and cons, they are generally effective.  It should be relatively
easy to expand the jurisdiction of such agencies to judicial nomi-
nating commissions.  Massachusetts simply provides that violation
of the code of conduct constitutes a resignation from the
commission.102
The utility of using judicial canons as models for a commission
code of ethics and an existing judicial oversight entity as the en-
forcement agency is two-fold.  First, the canons are generally ac-
cepted, understood, and include extensive commentary.  Second,
the enforcement entity should be quite familiar with the rules and
the sanctions available for canon violations.  Of course, the com-
plaint-and-enforcement process should also apply to violations of
statutory provisions governing the work of the commission.  Again,
the enforcement entity should have experience in addressing viola-
tions of statutory provisions or rules by judicial officers.  The wide-
spread acceptance of the canons, the general familiarity with their
application among enforcement authorities, and the existence of
enforcement agencies make this approach a very efficient and ef-
fective method for establishing productive codes of ethics for
commissioners.
iii. Judicial Selection Process
a. In General
How the commission conducts its business will have significant
impact on the public’s view of the nominating process.  Public sup-
port is important, and the commission can cultivate or decrease
public support through its actions.  For example, the question of a
quorum is an important factor in the perception of legitimacy.
Commissions should not have the authority to meet and conduct
business without a quorum with a high threshold.103  Requiring a
100. See DEL. R. JUDICIARY CT. 5 (2006) (establishing procedure for receipt of
complaints).
101. See id. R. 3 (establishing the Preliminary Investigatory Committee).
102. See Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, supra note 49, § 1.4.5.
103. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 2(a)-(d) to subdiv. 5 (West 2006)
(establishing a quorum of seven members of a nine- to eleven-person commission);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601(e) (2005) (setting quorum at eight members of an eleven
person commission). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-12-104(2)(c)(iv) (West 2006)
(permitting a nomination on a vote of three members of a seven person commission if
only four members are present due to absences of the remaining three members due
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substantial number of commissioners to be present in order to con-
stitute an official meeting enhances the appearance of propriety,
and the commission acts in a more representative fashion.
Commissions should have the authority to act immediately to
find qualified candidates if the announcement of an impending de-
parture is final and enforceable.  Work demands of many courts
dictate that commissions should identify and select nominees as
soon as possible.  Otherwise, in the case of trial courts, judges will
not be in a place to hear and decide cases in a timely fashion.  Simi-
larly, on appellate courts, vacancies may delay or greatly affect
those courts’ rulings.
Once a vacancy occurs (or, possibly, an impending vacancy is an-
nounced),104 the commission should provide notice of the opening
to all potential applicants.  If the position were for a court of state-
wide jurisdiction, all attorneys in the state should be notified of the
vacancy and the method by which they can apply for the posi-
tion.105 Similarly, if the opening were for a local position, all local
attorneys should be notified.  After notifying potential applicants,
the commission will need to process the applications for the posi-
tion.  Vacancies are not guaranteed to bring either adequate or rea-
sonable numbers of applications.  Certainly, a commission should
seek a sufficient number of suitable applicants from which to select
the requisite number of nominees.
This raises the question of whether the commission should con-
sider nominations before there is a vacancy.  In other words,
should commissions commence the application and screening pro-
cess as soon as someone announces that she will retire on a certain
date, or should (or must) they wait until an actual vacancy occurs?
Some states do permit their commissions to act once a vacancy is
certain to occur.106  Commissioners should not be eligible for nomi-
nation to the court while they are serving on, and perhaps for some
years after they leave, the commission.  Otherwise, the commis-
to inability to attend, recusal, or disqualification).  By setting a high quorum, it is
possible that a meeting may be difficult unless provision is made for the appointment
of substitute commissioners in the case of extended illness, disqualification, or other
inability to serve on the part of any commissioners.
104. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-27-3-1(d) (West 2006) (authorizing commission
action once “it is known that a vacancy will occur at a definite future date . . . .”).
105. The notice should be given to all attorneys whether they are qualified for the
judgeship for two reasons.  First, it helps ensure that the notice reaches all qualified
attorneys.  Second, the commission should not expend the effort to pre-qualify per-
sons who may not apply for the position because of efficiency, costs, and the possibil-
ity of error.
106. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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sioner may have a conflict of interest in that the commissioner may
use her position to further her own nomination (and appointment)
to the bench.
Commissions that encounter a large pool of applicants often
have the staff, chair, or a special subcommittee, conduct a prelimi-
nary screening of the applications.107  This sets the stage for the full
commission to conduct more efficient applicant investigation and
screening.  Although an initial screening allows a commission to
trim the number of applications in an efficient and timely manner,
it also raises concerns.  If the chair, a small committee, or commis-
sion staff, conducts an initial screening, the commission as a whole
may never consider some qualified applicants.  This does not mean
that a commission cannot engage in an initial screening, but if
screening is necessary, it should be well-planned, appropriately
structured, fair, and regulated.
A preliminary screening approach promotes efficiency in weed-
ing out those who clearly will not survive the rigors of the nominat-
ing process, but it should be conducted in a careful manner and
utilize criteria established in advance.  Fixed and uniform criteria
that apply to all applicants create predictability and warrant public
support.  When a commission delegates preliminary screening re-
sponsibilities to the chair, a screening committee, or staff, the com-
mission should nevertheless remain involved.  To ensure that the
entire commission reviews and considers each candidate, the sub-
committee or staff should provide each commissioner with a list of
the applicants recommended for summary elimination.  Each com-
missioner could then request that the entire commission consider a
particular application.
Alternatively, the commission could use a screening-vote proce-
dure.  For example, in Utah, although the staff initially verifies that
each candidate meets the legal qualifications for judicial office, it is
the commission members who preliminarily review the applica-
tions, discuss the applicants’ qualifications, compare the informa-
tion with the evaluative criteria, and vote (via secret ballot) to
retain or eliminate an applicant.108  This screening-vote procedure
is more democratic than preliminary screening by the chair, a
107. See, e.g., UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., supra note 31, at app. A ¶ Organi-
zational Meeting (G) (West 2006) (providing for staff screening and elimination of
applicants not qualified by law for the judicial position, followed by commission sum-
mary screening of remaining candidates to reduce the field of applicants to a “man-
ageable number”).
108. See id.
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screening committee, or commission staff because it allows all com-
mission members to vote for each applicant’s retention in, or elimi-
nation from, the nomination process.  The process need not
necessarily be that complex.  A more expeditious process might
simply involve a procedure such as reading each applicant’s name,
asking whether commissioners favor an interview of that applicant,
and eliminating those applicants who fail to garner the support of a
sufficient number of commissioners.  The number of votes neces-
sary for an application to survive an initial screening could be rela-
tively small.  There is no need for a majority vote on initial
screening decisions.
Another initial screening option is for commission subcommit-
tees (e.g., three commissioners, including at least one attorney and
one layperson) to conduct preliminary interviews of a specified
number of applicants.  The panels would then recommend merito-
rious applicants for a final interview before the full commission.
This option, too, seems less democratic because it does not involve
the entire commission in the screening process.  This option is po-
tentially dangerous because the panel could eliminate an applicant
who would have otherwise been nominated by the commission be-
cause the panel was different compared to the larger group.
Utilizing an appropriately designed preliminary screening pro-
cess should ensure fairness and efficiency in weeding out those who
clearly will not survive the rigors of the nominating process.  Addi-
tionally, an effective screening process could garner public support
by establishing a set of criteria that are generally applicable to all
applicants, thus promoting predictability.  It might also be helpful
to develop certain procedures to expedite the application process.
Requiring that persons seeking consideration complete a formal
application and provide a list of character witnesses will quicken
the pace and remove unmotivated nominees who are not commit-
ted to the process.
1. Investigation
A potential candidate provides the initial source of information
about her candidacy.  Requiring candidates to complete formal,
written applications can provide a substantial portion of the infor-
mation necessary for the commission.  For example, Alaska re-
quires applicants to complete questionnaires as part of its
application process which provide information about the appli-
cants, and requires the applicants to grant waivers of confidential-
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ104.txt unknown Seq: 34 12-APR-07 9:06
106 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
ity on all materials used for the investigation.109  The commission
obtains the right to examine financial information such as tax re-
turns and financial statements.110  Gathering personal information
in this manner provides documentary evidence of the potential
nominees’ qualifications and financial interests, and offers intima-
tions about their private life and character.  These written ques-
tionnaires and the accompanying waivers constitute an efficient
way to garner information at the beginning of an investigation.
Regardless of the detail and precision of the applicant question-
naire, the commission cannot thoroughly, or completely, evaluate
an applicant solely on paper.  Each applicant who survives the pre-
liminary screening warrants the commission’s further investigation.
The investigation may consist solely of interviewing a candidate’s
references and possibly other persons who know the applicant pro-
fessionally or personally.  Additionally, commission rules should
establish a uniform list of agencies for the commission to contact
(such as law enforcement and the bar), for additional information
about each of the applicants.  The commission should also obtain
appropriate records, such as bar disciplinary records or law en-
forcement records, and integrate them into the applicants’ packets.
Staff members, law enforcement, or in small jurisdictions, commis-
sioners could conduct the investigations.  Regardless of the method
of investigation, each candidate should undergo the same level of
investigation and scrutiny.
If feasible, the commission may wish to survey all attorneys (or,
alternatively, at least a statistically reliable sample of attorneys), in
the jurisdiction to determine whether applicants have suitable
characteristics for judicial office.  Some states already conduct such
surveys.111  Additionally, the commission may seek comments from
interested members of the public.112  For example, some states pub-
licly release the applicants’ names and hold hearings at which pub-
lic comments are invited.  The commission could also utilize press
releases or media advertisements to solicit comments.  Any process
109. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL APPOINT-
MENT, available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Selection/AppFillin12.pdf (last visited
Jan. 11, 2006).
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note
45, § III(A) (explaining bar polling); GREENSTEIN, AJS HANDBOOK, supra note 45,
ch. 6, p. 109 (noting that Alaska and Idaho conduct surveys of the bar; including
examples of survey forms in appendix C).
112. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note
45, § III(B).
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that increases public participation works to increase public accept-
ance of the commission while ensuring democratic ideals.
2. Interviews
Commissions obviously should interview the candidates.  Al-
though a preliminary screening can eliminate those applicants who
fail to meet legal qualifications, and an en banc initial screening by
the commission may be used to reduce the field of candidates to a
workable number, the commission should interview most, if not all,
viable candidates.  These interviews may be conducted in public or
private sessions.  At least one commission leaves that choice to the
candidate,113 although more than the candidate’s wishes should go
into the decision whether to open or close the interviews.
Interviews of other individuals personally or professionally ac-
quainted with an applicant are another potentially helpful method
for collecting information about candidates, although some com-
missions may have too many vacancies and/or candidates to permit
such a time-consuming process.  Alaska, though, utilizes an inter-
view process in which the commission invites any person to come
before the commission for an interview.114  This process provides
another perspective of potential nominees.  People who personally
know the potential candidate have information and perspectives
that the commission cannot acquire without considerable time and
effort.  If the commission has the time to hear witnesses, it not only
provides the commission with that information, but also adds to the
commission’s image as an independent and responsible body.
b. A Passive Application Process Versus Proactive Recruitment
Whether a commission will actively recruit judicial applicants is
an important issue warranting careful consideration.  Two distinct
models exist.  Some commissions are proactive in identifying, culti-
vating, and nominating judicial candidates.115  Other commissions
113. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL APPOINT-
MENT, supra note 109, at 15.
114. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 45,
§ III(B) (“The Council holds a public hearing to receive public comments.”).
115. See, e.g., id. § I(A)(2) (“Council members and staff may actively encourage
qualified persons to apply for a judicial position.”); HAW. JUDICIAL SELECTION
COMM’N R., supra note 83, at R. 7A (“Commissioners may actively seek out and
encourage qualified individuals to apply for judicial office.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-
2909(a)(2) to (b) (2005) (providing that the commission is not limited to candidates
but may tender nominations to other persons conditioned on commission approval,
and authorizing nominations of attorneys who do not reside in the district served by
the court on which the vacancy exists); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 7 (West
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only provide notices of vacancies and await applications.116  Natu-
rally, there are pros and cons for each approach.
A proactive commission may identify potential candidates who
would not present themselves for nomination.117  Unfortunately,
this approach has costs.  First, the public (as well as the bar) may
not view the proactive commission as “neutral” in its nomination
process.118  The public might believe that the commission is biased
in its work.  Potential candidates whom the commission does not
contact in its recruiting process may decide not to seek judicial of-
fice.  Thus, while the proactive approach may cultivate additional
candidates, it may also drive potential candidates away.
If a commission possesses a reputation for balanced, principled
action, and provides sufficient notice of vacancies to potential can-
didates, there should be little need for the commission to proac-
tively recruit candidates.119  On balance, it would seem prudent for
commissions to review applications rather than recruit candidates.
In this way, the commission remains more neutral, does not inad-
vertently drive qualified applicants away, and can maintain public
support.
2006) (“The commission shall actively seek out and encourage qualified individuals,
including women and minorities, to apply for judicial offices.”); R.I. UNIFORM R. P.
FOR THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’N, supra note 83, § 1 (proposed revision Oct.
29, 2001), available at http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/JNC/JNC_831.pdf
(providing that the “Commission shall actively seek out and encourage applications
from qualified individuals . . . .”); see also COMM’N, FEERICK REPORT, supra note 29,
at 7 (recommending that proposed New York commissions “should actively recruit
judicial candidates . . . .”).
116. See, e.g., TUSCALOOSA COUNTY (ALA.) JUDICIAL COMM’N R. 7 (2003) (on file
with author) (“The members of the Judicial Commission will not solicit any person to
submit his name or the name of another specified person for consideration for nomi-
nation by the Governor.”).
117. See, e.g., HAW. JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’N R., supra note 83, at 7A (“Com-
missioners should always keep in mind that often persons with the highest qualifica-
tions will not actively seek judicial appointment.”).
118. See, e.g., TUSCALOOSA CTY. (ALA.) JUDICIAL COMM’N R. 7 (“The Commission
considers that any such solicitation is incompatible with the utmost freedom of choice
that must be possessed by members of the Commission in voting for nominees, and
hence is inconsistent in principle with Rule 4 . . . , prohibiting a member of the Com-
mission from taking any action that implies a commitment to vote for any particular
person.”).
119. If a commission needs to recruit candidates because there are insufficient ap-
plications or only less worthy applicants, perhaps the benefits of holding judicial office
in that jurisdiction need review.
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c. Secrecy Versus An Open Process
[M]aking [judicial] selection invisible . . . muffles conflict, avoids
widespread competition, and strengthens the hands of political
elites.120
In establishing a new (or modifying an established) nominating
commission, one of the most important issues involves the extent
to which the proceedings and records of the commission will be
open to public scrutiny.  This decision greatly impacts the balancing
of democratic ideals and public confidence on the one hand against
the independence and effectiveness of the commission on the
other.
Openness should bolster public support.  Open proceedings al-
low a greater opportunity for public input and enhance public con-
fidence in the judicial selection system.  It is in the interest of
democracy and public confidence to allow the public to follow the
commission’s proceedings, and, when appropriate, to present the
commission with pertinent information about potential judicial
nominees.
Providing the public with an opportunity to be heard accom-
plishes several purposes.  First, information obtained from the pub-
lic helps the commission identify the best candidates for judicial
office.  Second, it boosts public confidence in the commission and
its proceedings.121  The quest to determine whether an individual is
a person of integrity can prove rather difficult.  Input from mem-
bers of the community where the potential nominee lives and prac-
tices may be the best, if not the only, source of this kind of
information.  Thus, public hearings constitute one additional way
to enhance the likelihood that relevant information may surface.
The democratic ideal of transparency and the public confidence
that openness engenders should significantly increase the public’s
acceptance of the commission paradigm.  This is not to say that the
public should have unfettered access to all of the commission’s in-
formation, or that everything that a commission does will garner
public support, but there should be enough openness to ensure that
the public will be sufficiently informed and confident that the nom-
inating commission operates without corruption or bias.122
120. HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS AND JUSTICE 112 (3d ed. 1993).
121. See Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 659 A.2d 777, 780 (Del. Super. Ct.
1995).
122. See, e.g., MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 9, at pt. 2, R. __
.05 cmt. (“Commission proceedings should be as open as possible.”).
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Obviously, a nominating commission cannot conduct all of its
business in the open.123  For instance, a commission must be able to
deliberate effectively about prospective nominees.  Thus, commis-
sioners must have access to personal and confidential information
about nominees that pries far deeper into personal information
about individual applicants than might otherwise be, or should be,
publicly available.  The commissioners also must be able to can-
didly discuss the nominees, and in so doing, be free from the gen-
eral public’s emotional appeals and pressure from interested
political actors.124  At the same time, sufficient openness must exist
to demonstrate that the commission is free from the cronyism and
commission-captures that threaten its independence.  Such trans-
parency catalyzes public confidence about the fairness of the
process.
Thus, a carefully constructed balance must be struck between the
two diametrically opposed objectives of openness and confidential-
ity.  This can be accomplished by allowing for public hearings fol-
lowed by confidential interviews of the prospective nominees and
commission deliberations.  The balancing of concerns means that
the commission should release basic biographical, professional, and
certain personal information of perspective nominees.  At a mini-
mum, this information should include where they are from, where
they were educated, how long they have lived in the state or dis-
trict, and the nature of their main areas of practice and expertise.
The commission should maintain confidentiality with regard to
more private information, such as financial, health-related, or inti-
mately personal information.
All jurisdictions allow commissions to hold confidential hearings,
and some jurisdictions require them.125  Other commissions hold
public hearings prior to any closed proceedings.126  Closed pro-
123. See, e.g., Guy, 659 A.2d at 782 (observing that “not all public business can be
transacted completely in the open, that public officials are entitled to the private ad-
vice of their subordinates and to confer among themselves freely and frankly, without
fear of disclosure, otherwise the advice received and the exchange of views may not
be as frank and honest as the public good requires . . . .” (quoting Soucie v. David, 448
F.2d 1067, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring))).
124. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 12 (West 2006) (“Meetings of
the commission may be closed to discuss the candidates.”); MODEL JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION PROVISIONS, supra note 9, at pt. 2, R. __ .05(b) (“All final deliberations of the
judicial nominating commission shall be secret and confidential.”).
125. See, e.g., KY. SUP. CT. R. 6.050 (providing that commission meetings “shall be
closed to the public”).
126. See, e.g., Marks v. Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 461 N.W.2d 551, 552-53 (Neb.
1990) (describing the work of a commission using such a process).
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ceedings permit a more candid discussion as well as the most effec-
tive and honest evaluation of the potential nominees.127  The
ballots, notes, deliberations (written and spoken), and the commis-
sioners’ votes should be kept confidential to ensure the indepen-
dence and effectiveness of the nominating commission.128
Additionally, personal information, such as marital status, medical
records, grievance records, and unproductive criminal investiga-
tions, should be kept private to protect the nominee’s privacy.129
Courts usually protect the confidentiality of these proceedings and
records under state law,130 rubrics of executive privilege131 or pub-
lic interest privilege,132 or as exceptions to state sunshine or disclo-
sure laws.133
127. See, e.g., Guy, 659 A.2d at 780-83 (discussing the need for confidentiality of
records and frankness of discussions, and recognizing an executive privilege with re-
gard to commission records and proceedings).
128. See, e.g., Justice Coal. v. First Dist. Court of Appeal Judicial Nominating
Comm’n, 823 So. 2d 185, 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that commission
vote sheets, ballot tally sheets, and ballots were not open to public exposure under
constitutional provisions creating commission); see also MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION
PROVISIONS, supra note 9, at pt. 2, R. __ .05(b) (providing that commission delibera-
tions shall be “secret and confidential”).  But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-44a(i)
(West 2006) (“No vote of the commission on a new nominee shall be by secret
ballot.”).
129. See, e.g., James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in
State Judicial Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 712
(2002) (“Due to the sensitive nature of such information, individuals may be appre-
hensive about applying for  judgeships.  In an effort to reduce the fear candidates may
have of exposing their private histories, commissioners should keep candidate infor-
mation confidential.”).
130. See, e.g., KY. SUP. CT. R. 6.050 (providing that records and proceedings of the
nominating commission are confidential); Justice Coal., 823 So. 2d at 189 (concluding
that commission vote sheets, ballot tally sheets, and ballots were not open to public
exposure under constitutional provisions creating commission).
131. See, e.g., Kanner v. Frumkes, 353 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(noting the fact that nominating commissions possess an executive privilege, and
holding them exempt from state sunshine laws).
132. See, e.g., Lambert v. Barsky, 398 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (quash-
ing subpoena for commission records on basis of a common law public interest privi-
lege for confidential public documents).
133. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-12-104(4) (West 2006) (exempting nominat-
ing commissions from state open meetings and records laws); Judiciary Comm. Of the
Gen. Assembly v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 473 A.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1983) (reversing administrative agency’s order of access to certain records of com-
mission based on exemptions in state freedom of information act and failure of
agency to conduct proper balancing analysis; noting exemption which does not allow
the disclosure of “personnel or medical files and similar files” as “invasion[s] of per-
sonal privacy” (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-19(b)(2) (West 2006))); Lambert v.
Executive Dir. of the Judicial Nominating Council, 681 N.E.2d 285, 287-88 (Mass.
1997) (holding commission and its records not within state freedom of information or
open meetings laws).
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The need for transparency in commission operations and public
confidence in the nomination process necessitate that at least part
of judicial nominating commissions’ work should not only be sub-
ject to public scrutiny, but even should be publicized.  In fact, a
majority of states that employ a commission approach probably
should make more extensive public and press disclosures regarding
nominees.  Thus, for example, at the very minimum, the names of
the potential nominees, limited biographical and professional in-
formation, and the final commission’s recommendations should be
released to the public and the press.134  A limited release of infor-
mation can provide some control over the nature and extent of in-
formation that is made available to the public, protect the
individuals under consideration for judicial posts, enable the com-
mission to obtain and address information of personal and prying
nature, and provide adequate information and notice to the public
to permit scrutiny and, if desired, appropriate participation.  Yet,
some commissions do not normally release even that modicum of
information.135
d. Inaction
As an essential part of a judicial nominating scheme, a person or
an entity should be authorized to act upon the default of the ap-
pointing authority.136  Otherwise, an impasse could arise, or an ap-
pointing authority could simply procrastinate while the court
vacancy remains unfilled.  In a strong-commission system, the ap-
pointing authority must appoint from the list of nominees.  If the
appointing authority fails to do so within a fixed period of time,
another person or entity, such as the chief justice of the state su-
134. Alternatively, the governor should release the names if the commission fails to
do so. See, e.g., MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 9, at pt. 2, R. __
.06, http://www.ajs.org/js/provisions.pdf (providing that the governor shall release the
names of nominees).  Releasing such information to the press helps ensure the accu-
racy of news accounts.  Without such information, news stories may be speculative
and inaccurate.
135. See, e.g., HAW. JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’N R., supra note 83, at R. § 2(A)
(1979) (noting that “all commission records, proceedings, and business, including the
names of all proposed nominees and the names of nominees forwarded to the ap-
pointing authority shall be confidential and may not be discussed outside commission
meetings . . . .”); R.I. UNIFORM R. P. FOR THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’N, supra
note 83, § VI (proposed revision Oct. 29, 2001) (requiring only the publication of the
names of the nominees recommended to the governor).
136. See, e.g., MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 9, at pt. 1, art.
__ § 1 & Alternative A (suggesting that a judicial officer make the appointment if the
governor fails to act within thirty days).
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preme court137 or the commission itself138 makes the appointment.
In weak-commission systems, the appointing authority can veto the
list of nominees either by failing to appoint a judge within a set
period of time or by requesting a new slate of nominees.139  This
approach virtually authorizes external capture140 of the commission
by the appointing authority.
e. Renomination or Retention
Thus far, we have considered initial appointments.  The remain-
ing issue to be considered is whether the judicial nominating com-
mission scheme is amenable to the retention decision.  In some
states, judges are elected to new terms of office through either par-
tisan political elections141 or through retention-election
processes.142  In other states, the governor, the legislature, or both,
reappoint judges to new terms.143
Can a judicial nominating commission process be juxtaposed on
an existing re-selection scheme?  The question is worthy of a sepa-
rate article, and all of the issues cannot be addressed in the space
available, but should a jurisdiction decide to implement such a pro-
cess, it does appear feasible.144  Alaska’s Judicial Council, for ex-
ample, provides extensive retention information on each judge
137. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 37 (providing that the chief justice of the
supreme court shall appoint from the list of nominees if the governor does not make
the appointment within sixty days of receipt of the nominations); MONT. CONST. art.
VII, § 8 (allowing only thirty days); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-27-3-4 (West 2006) (same);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3009(a) (2005) (same).
138. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (authorizing the commission to appoint the
judge if the governor fails to act on an appellate or circuit court vacancy within thirty
days of receipt of the list of nominations or within ten days of rejection by the state
senate of an appointment by the governor, or if the chief justice fails to act on a
district court vacancy within thirty days of receipt of the list of nominations or within
ten days of rejection by the state senate of an appointment by the chief justice).
139. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 741(f) (requiring the commission to submit a
new list of nominees if the governor fails to make an appointment from the initial list
within sixty days); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (permitting governor to make one re-
quest that commission submit additional names).
140. See supra Part II.B.ii (discussing commission capture).
141. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152 (providing for election of all state judges);
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 22 (providing for election of intermediate-appellate and trial
judges).
142. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 38 (providing for retention elections; applica-
ble to appellate and trial judges); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d).
143. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (authorizing state general assembly to elect
judges).
144. See, e.g., MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 9, at pt. 4
(“Implementing a Retention Evaluation Program: Model Legislation (or Court
Rules).”).
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seeking retention to the voters prior to the retention election.145
Moreover, such a process could help reduce the impact of raw
politics while adhering to democratic ideals, supporting indepen-
dence, and perhaps fostering public support for the judiciary.
In a jurisdiction in which the governor or legislature reappoints
judges, once the political powers accept the concept, inserting a
judicial nominating commission into the reappointment process
should not be too difficult.  Judges simply would notify the com-
mission of their intent to seek reappointment.  The commission
could review their applications and decide whether or not to re-
nominate the incumbents.  Should the commission decide not to re-
nominate an incumbent, the seat would be deemed vacant and the
commission would commence the nomination process for a succes-
sor.  Hawaii utilizes this approach.146
In jurisdictions that employ ballot retention or reelection
schemes, inserting a judicial nominating commission into the
scheme may prove more problematic, but feasible through modifi-
cation.  In this modified process, judges who choose to seek reelec-
tion or retention would notify the commission of their intent to
seek reelection or retention.  The commission then would review
the candidacy and determine whether the incumbent judge could
meet the minimum requirements to run for reelection or seek re-
tention as an incumbent.  If the commission decided in the candi-
date’s favor, the reelection-retention process would ensue.  If the
commission rejected the candidacy, a vacancy would be declared,
and the commission would commence the nomination process for a
successor.
Inserting a commission into these re-selection schemes brings
positive and negative attributes.  Using a commission in this man-
ner potentially reduces political powers and increases indepen-
dence and public confidence in the process.  If the commission is
not structured and positioned well, however its presence could
have contrary results by increasing the influence of politics, creat-
ing dependency, and causing public concern.  These issues are wor-
thy of much more investigation and discussion than this Article can
provide.
145. See Alaska Judicial Council, Retention Evaluation Information, http://www.
ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retent.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2006).
146. See HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (providing for judicial selection commission re-
appointment of incumbent justices and judges).
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III. DESIRABLE ATTRIBUTES OF CANDIDATES
To commence this discussion, we must distinguish judicial quali-
fications from desired attributes.  Constitutional law147 or stat-
utes148 may provide certain minimum qualifications for judicial
officers, such as a period of residency in the judicial district,149 a
minimum (or maximum) age,150 possession of a law degree, or a
certain number of years of legal practice,151 but little more than
such basic criteria.  Candidates are qualified for judicial posts only
if they meet these bare-bones provisions, and the provisions truly
may be bare-boned.  For example, the Alabama Constitution pro-
vides only that judges shall be licensed to practice law and possess
such other qualifications as the state legislature may provide.152
Obviously, any judicial nominating commission would ensure that
all viable candidates for appointment possess such minimal legal
qualifications.153  The commission’s staff can perform this screening
to ensure that the applicants meet the basic legal qualifications for
the judicial post they seek.
147. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7 (stating citizenship and residency require-
ments, and making bar membership a prerequisite, but omitting any age require-
ment); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (stating age, citizenship, and residency
requirement for judicial candidates).  Although the Texas Constitution omits an age
requirement, the legislature has added one by statute. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 24.001 (Vernon 2006) (setting twenty-five years of age as the minimum for state
district judges).
148. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.160 (2005) (establishing minimum age, resi-
dency, and experience requirements for state district judges); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 24.001 (setting twenty-five years of age as the minimum for state district judges).
149. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 14 (specifying a minimum of three years
state residency, and providing that trial judges must reside in district); UTAH CONST.
art. VIII, § 7 (requiring U.S. and Utah citizenship, and for courts with geographically
defined districts, residency within the respective district).
150. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 14 (setting the minimum age for judges at
thirty-five); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (establishing a minimum age of thirty for state
supreme court justices and twenty-five for judges of other courts of record); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.001 (setting twenty-five years of age as the minimum age for
district judges).
151. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 14 (requiring ten years legal experience for
supreme court justice nominees and six years legal practice for district judgeships);
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20(a) (providing that judges must have been admitted to prac-
tice for at least ten years prior to assuming state judicial office, or five years for cer-
tain lower court judgeships).
152. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 6.14.
153. See, e.g., UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., supra note 31, at app. A § D (stat-
ing that “the staff person assigned to a nominating commission reviews the applica-
tions to screen out those applicants not meeting the minimum constitutional
qualifications for office”).
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This section addresses the criteria or attributes used by the com-
missioners to rank the candidates and select the nominees.  These
criteria or factors are not qualifications in the legal sense; there-
fore, it is important that everyone involved in the process under-
stand the role, as well as the importance, of these criteria.
Furthermore, it is equally important that the commissioners and
their staff understand that the identification and selection of, as
well as the determination of the absence or presence of these crite-
ria, can only be made by the commissioners.  The staff, the commis-
sion chair, or a subcommittee of the commission can verify that
applicants are legally qualified, but only the commissioners can de-
termine and weigh the criteria about to be discussed.  Otherwise,
legally qualified applicants could be screened out and never consid-
ered by the commission based upon factors beyond pertinent con-
stitutional and statutory qualifications for judicial office.  That
understood, what are these criteria or considerations?
Juxtaposed on the basic qualifications for judicial office are de-
sired attributes, sometimes referred to as qualifications,154 although
not established as qualifications by law.  Even if a law did establish
these factors as qualifications for office,155 one would be hard
pressed to assess the factors as qualifications.  These attributes can
range from objective criteria such as diversity considerations (e.g.,
race or gender) to more subjective considerations such as legal
ability, judicial demeanor, integrity and good moral character, im-
partiality, intelligence, emotional stability, and social conscious-
ness.156  Additionally, judges must be good managers to handle the
heavy caseloads of today’s courts.157  Discerning whether a candi-
date meets certain objective criteria should be a relatively easy en-
deavor.  Measuring the presence of subjective criteria proves to be
much more difficult because of the impossibility of defining or
154. See, e.g., ABA, American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary, http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/home.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2006) (refer-
ring to the desired professional attributes for federal judicial nominees of “integrity,
professional competence and judicial temperament” as “professional qualifications”).
155. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01 subdiv. 8 (West 2006) (requiring com-
mission to consider eight “qualifications” for office, including judicial temperament
and community service).
156. See, e.g., GREENSTEIN, AJS HANDBOOK, supra note 45, ch. 5 (listing and dis-
cussing many of the criteria mentioned in the text).
157. See Colquitt, supra note 94, at 743 (“With tremendous caseloads, civil and
criminal, . . . judges are pressed to be effective managers . . . .”); Joseph A. Colquitt &
Jane W. Nelson, Become a Master of Judicial Studies, 27 JUDGE’S J. 18 (1988)
(“[J]udges must use appropriate decision-making skills and competently manage
caseloads and personnel.”).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ104.txt unknown Seq: 45 12-APR-07 9:06
2007] RETHINKING NOMINATING COMMISSIONS 117
identifying those criteria in a way that is not based upon individual
perception.  What seems to be acceptable judicial temperament to
one commissioner can be an obnoxious or over-bearing demeanor
to another, and there is no quantifiable way to establish which
commissioner is correct.
Subjective criteria exacerbate differences between commission-
ers because they leave open to interpretation any attempt to set
which of the criterion should gain prominence over the others and
be deemed essential for a candidate to possess.  Disqualifying a
candidate because she “is not collegial enough” is a very subjective
decision.  Qualifications for judicial office should be stated in ob-
jective terms.  Subjective criteria, though, must be included in the
selection process.158  We must trust commissioners to fairly and
evenly apply such subjective criteria during the selection process.
Otherwise, commissioners would exercise unfettered discretion in
selecting nominees from a larger group of legally qualified
applicants.
In establishing its selection matrix, the commission should iden-
tify those professional and personal attributes that are desirable.
Commissioners should be reminded of those qualities desired,159
and the selection process should be focused on those attributes.160
Thus, the application and supporting materials, bar polls, public
comments, and candidate interviews should be structured in a way
to enhance the ability of the commission to garner the necessary
information upon which to decide the relative rankings of the
candidates.
The subjective nature of these evaluative criteria presents at
least four problems.  First, it is difficult, if not virtually impossible,
to quantify the considerations because they are highly subjective.161
158. No one argues that nominating commissions should not consider these impor-
tant character traits in selecting the best nominees for the bench.  Such considera-
tions, however, rarely have the force of law as “qualifications” for judicial office.
Whether someone without social consciousness should be a judge is quite a different
question than whether someone is disqualified from consideration because they lack
social consciousness (assuming we can agree on a level of social consciousness that
establishes a threshold).
159. See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing training of commissioners).
160. The standards also should be applied uniformly to all candidates. See, e.g.,
COMM’N, FEERICK REPORT, supra note 29, at 7 (recommending that the commission
“apply consistent and public criteria to all candidates”).
161. Consider, for example, “the elusive quality called judicial temperament.”
GREENSTEIN, AJS HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 73.  A number of existing commis-
sions for judicial nominations or evaluations use judicial temperament (or a similar or
the same trait by another name) to evaluate judicial candidates.  See, e.g., HAW. JUDI-
CIAL SELECTION COMM’N R., supra note 83, at R. 10A(6), (instructing the commission
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Second, individual commissioners (or the commission itself) may
choose to act ad hoc by relying upon more objective, but unstated,
considerations. Thus, instead of attempting to quantify “integrity,”
a commissioner may resort to using defaults such as whether the
candidate is active in her church or has held positions of trust in the
past.  Third, ambiguities in the criteria leave room for biased com-
missioners to make decisions based on their preferences or
prejudices while cloaking their judgments in vague, but explicitly
identified criteria.162  Fourth, the criteria usually are not contained
in any statutes or constitutional provisions; therefore, they are not
the product of legislative action.  Instead, if the foregoing approach
is taken, the criteria are developed by the commission (or, perhaps,
its staff).  This results in a system that permits commissioners to act
beyond legislative guidance.
As noted, some of the subjective considerations are so undefined
and broad that it would be difficult for a judicial nominating com-
mission to evaluate whether a candidate possesses them within the
time allowed and resources available.  This leads to reliance on
more definable, albeit perhaps less important, criteria in an at-
tempt to identify the best-available judicial candidates.  Consider,
for example, a screening device that borders between objective and
subjective: the writing sample.  Virtually anyone would agree that
judges—appellate judges in particular, and trial judges perhaps less
to consider judicial temperament); R.I. UNIFORM R. P. FOR THE JUDICIAL NOMINAT-
ING COMM’N, supra note 83, § IV (listing temperament as a criterion demonstrating
“judicial capabilities”); see also BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION
OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, Guideline 5-4 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
jd/lawyersconf/pdf/jpec_final.pdf (referring to instructive evaluation of candidates’ ju-
dicial temperament).  The American Judicature Society defines this quality as follows:
Judicial temperament encompasses a variety of noble qualities.  One of these
qualities is dignity.  To be dignified a judge must possess ‘quiet, tactful ways,
and calm yet firm assurance.’  A jurist with appropriate judicial tempera-
ment uses authority gracefully.  Judicial temperament also requires sensitiv-
ity and understanding.  An understanding judge is sensitive to the feelings of
those before the court, recognizing that each and every case is important to
participants. Finally, a candidate is not temperamentally suited for the bench
unless he or she possesses great patience.  Patience is simply the ability to be
even-tempered and to exercise restraint in trying situations.
GREENSTEIN, AJS HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 73.  Suffice it to say that it might be a
mite difficult to determine the existence of, or quantify, a “calm yet firm assurance,”
“grace,” or “great patience.”  It likely would be even more difficult for a commission
of say, nine individuals to agree on which of the candidates possessed more grace or
evidenced more calm assurance.
162. Thus, party loyalists could choose fellow party members, or pro- or anti-tort
reform advocates could promote like-minded individuals while justifying their choices
with nebulous considerations.
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so—should be able to write.  Some states use writing samples dur-
ing the nominating process as a way of evaluating judicial ability.163
Alaska, for example, “carefully analyzes each writing sample for
correct grammar and syntax . . . .”164  Alaska also reviews the writ-
ing’s substantive content.  The Alaska Judicial Council’s staff mem-
bers conduct the evaluations.165  The evaluations are included in
the candidates’ files, which are provided to each of the Council’s
members.166
Weighty consideration of writing samples, though, depreciates
the fact that almost all judicial candidates must have a law degree.
A law degree obviously indicates that the individual has a higher
than average level of formal education that requires reasonably
well-developed communicative skills.  Likewise, a person possess-
ing a law degree has to be able to write intelligibly to receive a law
degree.  Identifying grammatical errors and building a tally is not
necessarily the most effective way to test a person’s legal (or judi-
cial) ability.  We can count the number of words in a sentence, ar-
gue about structure, and debate style.  But even properly
structured, grammatically correct sentences may ineffectively com-
municate a point in a judicial opinion.
It seems ill-advised to rely too much on the evaluation of a single
writing sample, even one that the candidate selected for inclusion
in the application packet.  As stated, most candidates for courts of
record have law degrees.  They may not possess stellar writing
skills, but they should be able to communicate.  Also, judicial writ-
ing courses are available to assist judges in this area.167  Unfortu-
nately, rather than giving necessary consideration to more
subjective and ill-defined criteria, commissioners asked to choose a
few nominees from a large number of candidates may rely too
163. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-27-3-2(a)(1) (2006); UT. R. J. NOM COMM MAN
app. A, § 4C (providing that applicants selected for interviews may be required to
submit a writing sample in response to a question proffered by the commission chair);
ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 45 (requiring a
writing sample as part of the application packet and establishing the criteria to be
used by the council staff in evaluating the samples).
164. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 45,
§ II(B)(3).
165. Id.
166. Id. § IV(2).
167. For example, the National Judicial College offers courses in Judicial Writing,
and Logic and Opinion Writing. See The National Judicial College, 2006 Chronologi-
cal Course Listing, http://www.judges.org/courses/chrono/2006 (last visited Jan. 11,
2007).
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much on the “more objective” writing sample to narrow their
choices.
Seemingly, a judicial nominating commission can find a more ef-
ficient and effective way to assess the bona fides of judicial candi-
dates, such as spending its time and resources conducting peer
reviews of other attorneys or asking judges or arbitrators before
whom the candidates have appeared for their assessment of the
legal ability and professional competence of the individual.168
Alaska does all, or virtually all, of the above,169 but that does not
mean that other jurisdictions that elect to study a writing sample’s
structure, syntax, and substance will not overly rely on writing
samples.
Considerations such as integrity, judicial temperament, and col-
legiality are not easily quantifiable, and are only ascertainable by
observation (perhaps over a long period of time).  Commissioners
are unlikely to have an adequate opportunity to observe, so they
may be left with the proffered opinions of others concerning such
important criteria.  Moreover, other considerations such as indus-
try and impartiality may be truly ascertainable only after a candi-
date has reached the bench.  And even if a commissioner has
ample opportunity to observe, she may be guided only by maxims
such as, “[t]he model judge must know instinctively the difference
between that which is important and that which is merely interest-
ing.”170  The ability of any person, no matter how qualified, to
quantify the instinctive ability of another person is purely subjec-
tive, thereby making it inherently suspect.
Although commissioners must use subjective criteria in ranking
candidates and choosing nominees, they must be careful in the pro-
cess.171  Because the criteria are ill-defined,172 possibly quite elu-
sive, and potentially unverifiable, proper identification of the
168. Alaska uses this approach. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, NOMINATING
PROCEDURES, supra note 45, § III(A) (detailing an extensive polling process).
169. See id. §§ I-V (detailing an extensive application, investigation, interview, and
polling process).
170. GREENSTEIN, AJS HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 74 (quoting Ruggero Aldis-
ert, What Makes a Good Judge?, 14 IJA REP. 1, 2 (Spring 1982)); see also Ruggero J.
Aldisert, In Memoriam, Max Rosenn: An Ideal Appellate Judge, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1025, 1030 (2006) (“The model judge must instinctively know the difference between
the important and the merely interesting.”).
171. For example, the focus on community contacts is easy enough to ascertain, but
it also breeds cronyism in the face of a judicial nominating commission that is not
properly diverse.
172. For example, reliance upon judicial temperament may lead commissioners to
select those that fit the preconceived stereotype of what a judge should be, which may
lead to selection of only those individuals that have certain cultural backgrounds.
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factors to be considered and training of the commissioners in the
use of the criteria are important.  Commissioners should base their
decision upon the more quantifiable or ascertainable attributes
rather than upon considerations that do not necessarily reflect the
ability of the candidate or the democratic ideals that a merit selec-
tion system is supposed to promote.  Other easily identifiable crite-
ria besides writing samples also rely upon attributes that do not
reflect democratic ideals.
By carefully compiling adequate data and letting the commis-
sioners decide the relative importance of various criteria after a
training session,173 commissioners can more reliably identify and
weigh appropriate attributes of candidates.  This approach would
give each commissioner adequate discretion in the nomination pro-
cess.  Not only would the commissioners decide which attributes
are present, but they also would weigh the criteria and decide
whether candidates meet the desired standards.  The American Ju-
dicature Society asserts that “[n]either graduation from law school
nor the fulfillment of a minimum requirement of years admitted to
practice is sufficient to acquire the professional skills needed for
judicial office.”174  This statement, in effect, contradicts many state
provisions that establish these criteria as the basis for eligibility.
Contrary to the Society’s view, a candidate is legally qualified for
judicial office if the constitutional or statutory qualifications are
met, regardless of whether the candidate has acquired the neces-
sary professional skills.  The additional criteria are used to assess
the candidate’s standing among competitors, not determine
whether the candidate is qualified for judicial office.  If the repre-
sentative bodies of those jurisdictions felt that graduation from law
school and a certain number of years in practice qualifies an indi-
vidual for judicial office, a judicial nominating commission lacks
the prerogative to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.
In sum, the legislatures of the various states have set the qualifi-
cations for judicial office in their states.  Judicial nominating com-
missions cannot usurp the prerogative of the legislature by
juxtaposing additional qualifications on those already established
by law.  Limiting the use of additional, more subjective criteria to
173. Former Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed concerns about the results of this
approach. See Marshall, supra note 30, at 178 (“I am troubled by judicial selection by
committee because it seems to me that two biases, or risks of biases, inhere in the
process: (1) objective criteria will be given undue weight; and (2) to the extent subjec-
tive factors are considered, they will be value-free or technical ones.”).
174. GREENSTEIN, AJS HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 74.
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the ranking and selection phases of the commission’s nominating
process appropriately separates legal qualifications and desirable
attributes.  Additionally, the separation places the determination
and weighing of the desirable attributes squarely on the
commissioners.
IV. SELLING THE APPOINTING PROCESS
Some states already use commissions to select judicial nomi-
nees.175  In those states without commissions, adopting a commis-
sion approach may involve more than mere legislation.  The public
must support the effort; otherwise, it may not succeed.  Therefore,
in those jurisdictions without judicial nominating commissions, an
extensive public relations campaign designed to educate and ani-
mate the public should be the first step toward adopting the com-
mission process.
One example of a well-planned and fruitful effort to educate and
enlist the public to significantly change the judicial structure and
process is Alabama’s effort to pass a constitutional amendment,
commonly known as the Judicial Article.  The effort began in the
mid-1960s and continued into the early 1970s.  Through the work
of the Citizens’ Conference on Alabama State Courts, former
Chief Justice Howell Heflin, the State Bar, the American Judica-
ture Society, corporations, associations, and individuals, wide-
spread public support developed for a wholesale overhaul of the
Alabama judicial system.  One issue raised at the initial meeting in
1966 was judicial merit retention for judges—”the Missouri plan or
a variation of it.”176
In 1972, by a vote of nearly 2-to-1, a constitutional amendment
was adopted that created a unified, modern judicial system for the
state.177  One of the first steps was the organization of public sup-
port;178 the result was a new court system.179  A similar effort to
175. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
176. Pelham J. Merrill, The Facts About Alabama Courts and Judges Today, 28
ALA. LAW. 139, 144 (1967).  At the time, Judge Merrill served as a Justice on the
Supreme Court of Alabama. Id.
177. For more complete accounts of the Alabama judicial-article effort, see A Con-
sensus Statement of the Citizens’ Conference on Alabama’s Judicial System, 34 ALA.
LAW. 152 (1973) [hereinafter A Consensus Statement]; Citizens’ Conference on Ala-
bama State Courts, 28 ALA. LAW. 131 (1967) [hereinafter Citizens’ Conference].
178. The building of public support began at the beginning of the effort.  “From the
outset there was no question that every segment of the population of Alabama should
be represented . . . .” Citizens’ Conference’, supra note 177, at 133.  The conferees
included over 100 diverse representatives from thirty-seven of Alabama’s sixty-seven
counties. Id. at 134-38.
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educate and animate public-minded citizens would prove most
helpful in establishing an appointment commission scheme in any
state without such a system.
Animating the public is not enough.  Citizens may agree that
nominating commissions are important, yet the message may be
derailed or lost in the legislative process.  For example, in 1973, the
Alabama Citizens’ Conference reported: “Judges should not be
elected but chosen under a non-political merit system of selection,
and laymen should participate in the nominating process.”180  As
successful as the Conference was, and it was very successful over-
all,181 its recommendation on merit selection and retention essen-
tially slid into oblivion.  Alabama continues to elect its judges
through a partisan political process.
V. CONCLUSION
Our goal is to place the best available candidates on our courts.
Although there is no one best way to select judges, regardless of
the method we choose—elective or appointive—judicial nominat-
ing commissions at least offer us a more desirable method for fill-
ing vacancies.  The task, though, is greater than merely filling
vacancies.  We must strive to seat the best candidates on the courts.
If we fail in that effort, at least we can strive to eliminate the seri-
ously under-qualified applicants.
Because most judges come to the bench by appointment to va-
cancies, judicial nominating commissions are the most worthy, ar-
guably critical, components of the judicial selection process even in
jurisdictions that elect their judges.  Nominating commissions,
though, are only as good as their organization, members, and pro-
cedures permit.  As we have identified previously,182 commissions
179. Interestingly, the one proposal that failed in the Judicial Article implementa-
tion was a new method of selecting judges.  It was suggested in order to change from a
popular partisan political campaign, to some type of merit selection, as it was then
called.  But that particular aspect of the sweeping Judicial Article died.  Nevertheless,
there was a constitutional provision passed stating that, on local option, judicial dis-
tricts could have judicial nominating commissions.  Seven circuits in Alabama have
opted to use judicial nominating commissions. See ALA. CONST. amends. 83, 110, 408,
607, 615, 660, 741.
180. A Consensus Statement, supra note 177, at 154.
181. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328 (codified as ALA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 139-72)
(containing a comprehensive revision of the Alabama judiciary; “judicial article”);
Jim Bennett & Sallie C. Creel, Alabama Citizens’ Commission for Constitutional Re-
form, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 597, 608 (2003) (“The new Judicial Article . . . transformed
Alabama’s sluggish and often ridiculed judicial branch into a model of
organization.”).
182. See supra Part I.B.
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should possess at least three attributes: they should be democratic;
they should be as independent as reasonably possible; and, they
should enjoy public acceptance and support.  The commission, to
the extent possible, should be a diverse, representative body that is
designed to address local needs.  Furthermore, it should operate
independent of the appointing authority and in a manner that will
generate and maintain public support.  Preferably, the nominating
commission system should encompass all courts within a state, but
if that is not feasible, the commission scheme should include as
many courts as possible.
In a 1977 speech, former Justice Thurgood Marshall pertinently
opined, “The crucial questions are what types of persons make ‘the
fittest’ judges, and by what process are they best elevated to the
bench.”183  Three decades later, those crucial questions remain, but
despite his misgivings, appropriately designed judicial nominating
commissions constitute perhaps the best method for resolving at
least the latter issue.
183. Marshall, supra note 30, at 177.
